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I.

INTRODUCfiON

In our human history, no society has ever existed in a state of
complete equilibrium. Various factors-physical, demographic, social
and so on-are always present, making new demands. Change is always an on-going social phenomenon. Nevertheless, the changes that
have occurred during the past two hundred years can be seen as one of
the most remarkable and fascinating experiences human beings have
ever had. The technological development, two world wars, urbanization, the population explosion, the end of colonization in non-western
societies are the striking revolutions of our time. Among these, the
end of colonization, the emergence of new nations, and the effort of
modernization by non-western societies are of special significance for
us.
Indeed, the struggle for independence and the effort to achieve
modernization in order to join the ranks of the prosperous, powerful,
and peaceful in non-western societies involve not only the domestic
development of societies but also the relations among them. Modernization thus becomes a special kind of hope to the people of non-westem societies. Political scientist David Apter once noted that "it
embodies all the supreme human desires." 1 For the people in these
societies, traditional ways of doing things are no longer the framework
within which modem societies conduct their business. To them,
"modem" means dynamic, concerned with people, democratic and
equalitarian, scientific, economically advanced, sovereign, and
inft uen tial.
But modernization is no easy task. This is particularly true in
non-western societies. The problem of modernization in many nonwestern societies arise partially due to the lack of a smooth tran<>formation based upon societal internal differentiation. S.N. Eisenstadt
said, "Modernization is the process of change toward those types of
I. David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1965), p. I.

(1)
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social, economic, and political system that has developed in western
Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth."2 Similarly, in Asia, the modern situation, as Robert N.
Bellah has found, "did not arise out of the East Asian past, either as
natural growth or as pathological observation; rather it came from
without. It came often sharply, even brutally, and it had no roots in
the past. " 3
Just like her Asian neighbors, the problems of modernization in
China are also extremely complicated. The history of modern China
is without any doubt a history of China's struggle toward modernization. It is a fascinating subject that has received a great deal of attention in the social science community in the recent years. The main
purpose of this essay is to review the existing literatures on Chinese
modernization with a goal of developing a theoretical synthesis that
could explain the socio-historical process of modernization in China.
This essay will begin with a critical review of theories of Chinese
modernization in western literatures, followed by a discussion of the
views from Chinese intellectuals. Then, a four-stage developmental
process of China's modernization effort during the past one hundred
and forty years will be presented, with special attention given to a .detail discussion on the socio-economic modernization of Taiwan since
1949. Finally, characteristics of China's modernization process will be
outlined and a theoretical synthesis based on the existing literatures
and China's experience
be proposed at the conclusion.

will

II. WESTERN THEORIES ON CHINESE
MODERNIZATION: A CRITICAL REVIEW
Hundred of books and articles have been written about China's
modernization, and several theories have also been proposed in recent
years in an attempt to explain this experience. However, most of these
theories seem to be preoccupied with the following two empirical
questions.
The first is concerned with the analysis of the structural weakness
in the traditional Chinese society which handicapped the possible
modernization before the 19th century. Such theorists as Max Weber,
Marion J. Levy, Robert N. Bellah, S.N. Eisenstadt, and Frances V.
Moulder have all at one time or another tried to explain why moderni2. S.N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p.l.
3. Robert N. Bellah, Tokuguwa Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 101.
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zation or industrialization did not occur within the Chinese traditional
social structure.
The second question that China specialists are interested in concerns with the failure of Chinese modernization programs proposed
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A few researchers seem
to be puzzled by the fact that although China and Japan started on
their way toward modernization at almost the same time, Japan succeeded in becoming a modern nation-state while China failed. This
group of researchers tended to focus their studies on analyzing conflicts between modern Chinese social and political structures and modernization planning itself. Examples of this focus are Lucian Pye's
work on the spirit of modern Chinese politics4 and Barrington
Moore's comparison of the modernization efforts of the Nationalists
and the Chinese Communists. 5
It is without any doubt that our understanding of the process of
Chinese modernization has been greatly benefited from the above mentioned studies. Nevertheless, we feel that the explanations offered in
them often seem fragmentary as well as narrow-minded.
Until now, what we really have are many small works aimed at
explaining the faults of Chinese society and the weakness of various
Chinese subsystems in developing a Western type of politics and economy. No attempt has been made, however, to understand the incompatibility of the concept of modernization in Chinese existing social
structure. No one has ever tried, for instance, to investigate the conditions under which modernization became a great evil to the Chinese in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries. There is a lack of awareness in
the existing literatures that the modernization process the Chinese experienced is quite different from the one the Western world had experienced earlier. Thus, any new theory on Chinese modernization has to
take into account such a difference between China and the West.
1.

The Role of Traditional Religion in China's Modernization

The most authoritative work on the study of the inability of the
traditional Chinese social structure to develop a capitalist modernization is Max Weber's Religion of China. 6
The major objective of Weber's work is to demonstrate that
4. Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1968).
5. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1967).
6. Max Weber, Religion of China (N.Y.: Free Press, 1968).
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China's failure to develop a rational bourgeois capitalism was due to
the absence of a particular kind of religious ethic for the needed motivation. The Religion of China was intended as a support for the major
theme in his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 7 in
which Weber tried to establish the Protestant ethic as an independent
causal factor in the development of modem capitalism in the West.
In Religion of China, Weber first examined five major concrete
factors in the Chinese social system as characterizing features having
relevance to the functional requirement of modem capitalism: the
monetary system, cities and guilds, the patrimonial state, kinship organization, and law. Although Weber saw many unfavorable conditions for the development of capitalism in these five major spheres, he
did find such favorable ones as the absence of status restriction by
birth, free migration, free choice of occupation, absence of compulsory
schooling and military service, and absence of legal restraint on usury
and trade. Weber said, "From a purely economic point of view, a
genuine bourgeois industrial capitalism not to appear in China was
basically due to the lack of a particular mentality," 8 such as that of
ascetic Protestantism.
Taking Chinese social structure on the material condition as
given, Weber then compared the differences between Chinese Confucianism and Western ascetic Protestantism. Table 1 is a comparison
between Confucianism and Puritanism in Weber's thesis as summarized by Reinhard Bendix. 9
It was this difference, according to Weber, that contributed to an
autonomous capitalist development in the West and the absence of a
similar development in China. Weber noted that, "to a striking degree
they (the Chinese) lacked rational matter-of-factness, impersonal rationalism, and the nature of an abstract, impersonal, purposive association. True 'communities' were absent, especially in the cities, because
there were no economic and managerial forms of association or enterprise which were purely purposive." 10
Religion of China indeed represents an extremely stimulating
work in the comparative study of the complex Chinese social system
and is a source of provocative ideas for the study of its patterns of
socioeconomic change. The value of this work is so enormous that
7. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (N.Y.: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1951).
8. Weber, Religion of China, supra note 6, p. 100.
9. Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City, N.J.:
Doubleday, 1962), pp. 140-142.
10. Weber, Religion of China, supra note 6, p. 240.
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TABLE 1
MAX WEBER'S CONCEPTIONS OF CONFUCIANISM
AND PURITANISM
Confucianism
Belief in impersonal, cosmic
order; tolerance of magic.
Adjustment to the world to
maintain harmony of heaven
and earth; the ideal of order.
Vigilant self-control for the
sake of dignity and selfperfection.

Puritanism
Relief in superamundance God;
rejection of magic.
Mastery over the world in
unceasing quest for virtue in
the eyes of God; the ideal of
progressive change.
Vigilant self-control for the
sake of controlling man's
wicked nature and doing God's
will.

Absence of prophecy related to
inviolability of tradition; man
can avoid the wrath of the
spirits and be "good" if he acts
properly.
Familial piety as the principle
governing all human relations.
Kinship relations as the basis
for commercial transactions,
voluntary associations, law and
public administration.
Distrust of all persons outside
the extended family.
Wealth as the basis of dignity
and self-perfection.

Prophecy makes tradition and
the world as it is appear
wicked; man cannot attain
goodness by his own efforts.
Subordination of all human
relations to the service of God.
Rational Law and agreement as
the basis for commercial
transactions, voluntary
associations, law and public
administration.
Trust of all persons who are
"brothers in the faith."
Wealth as a temptation and
unintended by-product of a
virtuous life.

most of the studies on Chinese society by contemporary Western
scholars have often taken it as an indispensable theoretical point of
departure. Because of its great importance, unfortunately, many of
Weber's followers have tended to ignore the many empirical problems
inherent in it.
In reviewing Weber's Religion of China, one must keep in mind
that the underlying theoretical orientation of Weber's work on the

6
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study of China, India and other civilizations was not so much as to
prove the existence of the capitalism in these societies, but rather to
demonstrate the highly unique characteristics of rational capitalist
economic development in the West. The basic foundation of Weber's
comparative methodology was thus to demonstrate the great importance of the rational mentality of the Protestant ethic in the development of Western industrialization and the lack of such a mentality in
all the other great civilizations, including China and India. With this
preoccupation in mind, Weber thus tended to pick only those factors
that favored his own arguments.
More specifically, in the case of China, Weber failed to make a
necessary distinction between the ideal and actual patterns of social
behavior in traditional Chinese society. Confucian ethnic, unlike
Christian ideology, was often regarded only as an ideal that was too
high to be reached by the common people in traditional China. The
Confucian ethic was in fact never a major force in popular culture of
the general population. Even those in the upper level of society rarely
practiced it as rigidly as was required in the original text of Confucian
Classics. What is now thought to be conservative may have been interpreted as progressive by different Confucian scholars in different
periods of China's long history, because the context in Confucian classics was so vague that it could be interpreted in either way. it is, therefore, misleading to take Confucianism as comparable with
Protestantism, as Weber did.
Weber also failed to realize that the country of China is too large
to be taken as a "cultural whole." many China specialists'' have
noted that in China there are a great many local cultures existing, each
with its own distinctive characteristics; even two nearby villages may
sometimes have quite different patterns of behavior norms and values.
Since Confucian ethic was often merely an ideal pattern, as we have
argued, the differences existing in local communities must have had
significant impact on the attitudes of the people living there toward
socioeconomic development. One apparent example of such a local
economically oriented culture can be found in Anhui province, for the
people of Anhui have been one of the most successful and influential
business groups in China ever since the tenth century; they dominated
Chinese commercial and banking businesses for many centuries. No
other territorial group in China has had such distinctive economic oriII. E.g., Wolfram Eberhard, A History of China (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1969). Freedman, Maurice, Chinese Lineage and Society (London: The Athlone,
1966).
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entation and achievement. If the people of An-hwei practiced Confucianism as precise as it was presented in the text which condemned
commercial business as evil, there would not be any so-called An-hwei
Businessmen in China's economic history.
One of the main arguments in Weber's Religion of China is that
there was no tension found in the traditional value system. He said
[There were] no tensions between nature and deity, between
ethical demand and human shortcoming, consciousness of
sin and need for salvation, conduct on earth and compensation in the beyond, religious duty and socio-political reality.
Hence, there was no leverage for influencing conduct
through inner forces freed of tradition and convention. 12
Here again, we saw that Weber took for granted that Confucianism
played the sole role in traditional Chinese society. Weber failed to
take into account the significant impact of Taoism on the Chinese
masses. As a school of philosophy, Taoism did represent one of the
most conservative schools of thought in the traditional Chinese philosophical system. But as a religious sect, it was one of the most progressive and rebellious groups in Chinese history. History shows that
revolutions and rebellions initiated by Taoists and their followers were
frequently observed in several of the Chinese dynasties. In fact, Taoism was the religion of the Chinese mass peasantry. To say that Taoism is conservative, therefore, is to misunderstand its great potential
for progressive change, which was often reflected in the Chinese peasantry, certainly the majority group of the Chinese population. To
completely ignore the popularity of Taoism as Weber did is
unforgivable.
In short, Weber's contribution on the analysis of Chinese social
structure is overshadowed by his preoccupation in attempting to prove
that the condition in traditional China was unfavorable to the development of rational capitalism.
Another similar theoretical argument on the relationship between
religious belief and modernization in China is found in Robert N. Bellah's Tokugawa Religion, which is designed to apply Weber's theory of
industrialization to the Japanese case.
Although Bellah does not deal with Chinese religious belief directly in his Tokugawa Religion, he often cites Chinese examples for
comparison with the Japanese experience. He notes:
At many points in this study implicit or explicit comparisons
12. Weber, Religion of China, supra note 6, pp. 235-236.
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with China have been made. This has usually been
prompted by the fact that so much of the cultural and religious tradition is common to both, whereas the process of
modernization took such a different course in China and Japan. We have usually attempted, whatever this subject has
come up, to use the basic value systems of the two societies
as a primary reference point in explaining the difference. 13
The basic difference between China and Japan, according to Bellah is that "China was characterized by the primacy of integrative
value whereas Japan was characterized by primacy of political or goalattainment value." The integrative value in China thus are more concerned with system maintenance than with goal-attainment or adaptation, more with solidarity than with power or wealth. The human
relations in China, in other words, is more concerned with particularistic ties than with universalistic attributes.
The Chinese saw the problem of system maintenance, according
to Bellah, "in terms of a determinate set of human relations that only
needed to be kept in a state of mutual adjustment for a harmonious
and balanced social system to result. An adjusted equilibrium is indeed the ideal of Chinese society." 14 Thus, the value of filial piety
clearly superseded political loyalty. Even the political loyalty existing
in traditional China was strongly "familistic." In short, Bellah argues,
the traditional Chinese polity was not constructed for progressive
change or goal-attainment, but for system maintenance.
Bellah concludes, therefore, the Chinese ethic lacks the dynamism which would overcome the traditionalism of the masses and
transfer the primacy allegiance from the family to some larger collectivity. The rationalism inherent in the Confucian ethic seems to need
to be linked with a value system in which political values have primacy if it is to have an influence in the direction of modernization.
From the above summary of Bellah's arguments, we can see he is
under the great shadow of Weber, even though he did try to use a
different language to describe it. For Bellah, the system maintenance
of integration in Chinese society is responsible for the lack of goalattainment or developmental motivation; whereas for Weber, it is the
Confucian doctrine of nature harmony and integration that is responsible for the failure of the development of capitalist economy. The
main difference between Bellah and Weber lies in the fact that Bellah
tried to focus his study on the religious tradition in the lives of "ordi13. Bellah, Tokuguwa Religion, supra note 3, p. 188.
14. Ibid., p. 189.
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nary people," while Weber was more concerned with Confucian ideology. It seems to me, then, Bellah's approach is much closer to the true
picture of Chinese daily life than Weber, for the reason we mentioned
earlier.
The main problem in Bellah's comparison of Japan and China is
that he seems to ignore the diversity of religious traditions among ordinary Chinese people. For it is evident that Japan's small population
of "ordinary people" is much more harmonious ideologically and religiously than their Chinese counterpart. As we mentioned before,
many different local cultures existed in China, and it is impossible to
consider the Chinese "ordinary people" as a homogenous group.
In methodology, Bellah also falls into the Weber's trap. Like
Weber, Bellah attempts to show that China lacked the ability of developing a rational economy which was contrast in Japan. It is quite
apparent that Japan is merely a substitute for Weber's West in Bellah's
work. In reading Takugawa Religion, there is a strong mixture of
Weberian theory and Parsonian language in it.
2.

Chinese Family Structure and Modernization

Marion J. Levy, Jr. has developed an interesting theory on the
inability of Chinese social structure for the development of modernization by looking into the role of the traditional family in China. Levy
suggested that the Chinese modernization might fail because of the
Chinese family's inability to change its inner structure to promote
change. Levy constructed a comparison between Chinese and Japanese families in an attempt to emphasize the Chinese shortcoming in
this particular respect.
Levy saw the major differences between Chinese and Japanese
family structures that are relevant for modernization as (1) how family
considerations enter the total social picture, (2) the fact that there was
no single ideal type of family in Japan, and (3) the emphasis on primogeniture in Japan. 15
The first of these main differences referred to the mechanism of
social integration, Levy said:
In Japan the family certainly occupied a position of strategic
importance, but it was definitely subordinated to other considerations in the society. This created in the society a possibility overriding or manipulating various aspects of the
15. Marion J. Levy, Jr., "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of Japan and
China," inS. Kuznets et al., eds., Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1955), pp. 495-536.
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family patterns for other purposes. In China this possibility
of manipulating family patterns in terms of other aspects of
the society was much more limited because the family structure of China was too a much greater degree the major focus
of the society than was the case in Japan. 16
One distinctive example is that, in Japan, loyalty to the feudal hierarchy took clear precedence over loyalty to one's family. Every man's
first duty in Japan was to his overlord while the family came second.
In China, on the contrary, nothing is more important than one's own
family.
The second of the differences between the Chinese and Japanese
family structures in relation to modernization turns on the marked
differences in class structures in the two societies. In theory, China
could be seen to have an open class system while in Japan the class
system was almost closed. This contrast was reflected in the status of
the merchants in these two societies. According to Levy, then, the
Chinese merchants held roles of extremely low prestige because the
open class system allowed the children of the merchants to move up
into the official bureaucracy, either through such formal channels as
examinations or through such informal channels as capital donations
or bribes. The ideal and highest goal of the upward mobility in China
was service in the official bureaucracy; wealth was one way to move
into this bureaucracy. Consequently, the status of merchants became
a "transitory status" for those who failed in examination but whose
goal was still to go to the official bureaucracyY
In Japan, Levy argued, the picture was completely different. The
closed class system inhibited any movement from the bottom to the
top, and thus, preserved the continuity of the status of merchants.
Levy said that "one was born to the social position of one's parents. It
was expected that one stay in it as well." 18 No matter how rich a man
was, he and his descendants still remained in the same social status.
Thus, the Japanese merchants did not have any motivation or incentive to move up into the feudal hierarchy in this closed class system.
They remained as merchants and worked hard to preserve thereby the
welfare of their family. This group of Japanese merchants then became an important factor in that country's economic development.
The third of the differences lies in the fact that the Japanese family instituted a sort of business civil service within their own compa16. Ibid., p. 531.
.17. Ibid., pp. 514-516.
18. Ibid., p. 516.
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nies, and those men most successful in the business competition and
destined to become major figures in the various enterprises of the family more frequently brought into the family membership. The role of
equal inheritance on the part of all sons that held in China was not
practiced in Japan, nor did the oldest sons always succeed to the family property or rights. Levy said that "he [the oldest son] could be,
and sometimes was, replaced by someone adopted as an oldest son, or
he could even be replaced by a younger one. . . . This made possible at
one and the same time the continued concentration of wealth in a single family line and the creation of a cadet class." 19
The immediate consequence of such a system of adoption-related
modernization is that economic capital could be easily passed from
one generation to another within a single family. This also means that
family wealth can be more effectively utilized in large-scale industrial
investment, and the criteria of adoption, in terms of universalistic
competence, may encourage an effective and successful business
operation.
Although it may very well be true that the Chinese family was
responsible for the failure of the development of Chinese modernization, as Levy has suggested. The three major contrasting factors are, it
seems to me, not very likely to be the most crucial ones in the different
processes of modernization experienced by China and Japan. There
are several problems in levy's theoretical arguments.
First, there is some evidence that the Chinese can develop a successful enterpreneur society under the traditional family structure.
Studies on the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia have clearly demonstrated this to be true. 20
Second, the argument on the class structures in Japan and China
is a strange one, for mobility is often regarded as the necessary condition to develop a capitalist system. As a matter of fact, economic
growth and development can hardly sustain without a free occupational mobility. In addition, I also find other reasons to question
Levy's argument here. First, in a closed-class system like Japan's,
there certainly was no motivation for upward mobility into a higher
social class. A merchant is always a merchant under this system.
Thus, is he expected to work hard all his life for nothing but wealth?
Second, in a society as isolated as Japan's was in the pre-industrial
period, the majority of the population would be peasants while the size
19. Ibid., p. 517.
20. W.G. Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1957).
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of the merchant class was likely to be small. Then, how could the
merchants inspire the peasants to join their revolt against the existing
system, if they themselves had no chance to move up? Even Weber
agreed, as we mentioned earlier, China, in comparison with Japan,
probably had a better chance to develop its socio-economic modernization than Japan insofar as the class structures are concerned.
As mentioned earlier, Levy also argued that the role of the Chinese merchant is merely a transitory one because his ultimate goal is in
the official bureaucracy. Levy claimed that such an open-class system
encouraged the talented people to go to the official bureaucracy instead of staying in the merchant class, and by emphasizing the high
value of the bureaucracy, therefore, has undoubtedly hurt the development of an entrepreneur class in China. But I do not believe this lack
of an enterpreneur class development was due to the result of the recruitment process of the bureaurcracy through which government recruited all the talented men while leaving only the less intelligent in
the business world, as Levy strongly suggested. Rather, it seems to
me, it is because the tremendous investment in both human energy
and capital, which could otherwise be used in socioeconomic development went into the preparation for the examination that handicapped
the business and other commercial developments. Very often, as stories told by history, ten years, or even one's whole life, could be and
was spent in this important endeavor in traditional China in the hope
that someday he would pass the examinations.
In regard to the third difference, one important question Levy
leaves unanswered is what percentage of merchants in Japan practiced
the idea of adoption? In other words, how many merchants in Japan
actually adopted a capable business partner or co-worker from outside
the family to succeed them in the business and replace their own sons
in the family? Was this only a possible "ideal" or was it really practiced in most of the great Japanese merchant families? Levy did not
provide any empirical evidence to support his argument.
In short, what may be the contrasting characteristics between the
japanese and the Chinese family structures may not be the "contrasting factors" at all in modernization processes experienced differently
by these two societies. Moreover, Levy never gave us any explicit rationale or justification for his selection of the points he compared.

3. Chinese Political Structure and Modernization
Three major works in this field will be discussed here. They are:
Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,
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S.N. Eisenstadt's The Political Systems of Empires, and Lucian W.
Pye's The Spirit of Chinese Politics.
Moore's main theoretical argument regarding China's failure to
modernize is focused on the political implication of social structures in
that country. First, according to Moore, large numbers of lower-degree candidates at the bottom of the official Chinese system of ranking
dissipated their energy in fruitless revolt and insurrection within the
prevailing framework. Conversely, the lower ranks of the Japanese
samurai provided much of the impetus toward modernization during
the 19th century. 21
Second, according to Moore, the imperial Chinese society never
created an urban trading and manufacturing class comparable to the
one that grew out of the latter stages of feudalism in Western Europe.
Since the Chinese believed that money-making activities represented a
dangerous threat to the scholar-official's image and legitimacy, the
government was very careful not to allow such activities to get out of
control. Thus, they taxed commerce for their own gain, or they
turned business into state monopoly and kept the most lucrative positions for themselves.
Third, according to Moore, the Chinese government was too
weak to have any national industrialization program because most of
the commercial and industrial elements were foreign and largely beyond its control in the late 19th century. Further, any attempt to use
modern technology was made by the powerful local provincial gentry
for their own separatist purpose.
Fourth, Moore indicated, there was no independent ideology of
the Chinese middle class in the nineteenth century.
Finally, China failed to adopt a commercial agriculture; the Chinese landowner showed no enthusiasm for improving production
methods for the sake of the urban market. And because of this, Moore
argued, the Chinese peasantry in the first half of this century turned
against the urban-middle class oriented Nationalist government while
giving their support to the Chinese Communists.
The main issue in Eisenstadt's study of the processes of change in
Chinese society is that the condition necessary for the development of
extensive marginal and total changed did not exist in traditional
China. The principle type of change that dominated China's long history was, according to him, "accomodable change." He said:
China presents a good example of a society in which
processes of accommodable change occurred and of the con21. Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, supra note 5, pp. 162-177.
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crete conditions under which they tend to develop. In
China, throughout many centuries (until the end of the nineteenth century and the meeting with the West), accommodable and marginal (rebellious and dynastic) changes
constituted the principal types of change. On the other
hand, all the marginal types of change either evaporated or
merged in the processes of accommodable change, becoming
reintegrated into the basic framework of the political
institutions. 22
Processes of accommodable change were connected with the social condition that made possible the continuous fundamental harmony in traditional Chinese polity. Conflicts among different political
groups were often regulated through the existing norms and activities
of the major political and regulative institutions of the society.
Eisenstadt argued that three vital tendencies capable of undermining the existing institutional framework never fully developed in
traditional China: (a) the potential trend toward feudalization as patrimonial decentralization which was often blocked by the gentry and
the older aristocracy; (b) the tendency toward complete independence
of the urban merchant and professional groups; and (c) the trend toward development of activistic, universalistic, religious and cultural
orientations. He then concluded that failure to develop these three
great tendencies made the later modernization attempt more
difficult. 23
The third major work on Chinese political institution and modernization is Lucian W. Pye's The Spirit of Chinese Politics. His central argument is that there was an authority crisis in Chinese politics
in particular and in society generally. The lack of a national identity
and of effective norms of authority made it difficult for the Chinese to
move toward successful development and modernization. Pye said
that "basic problem in development for the Chinese has been that of
achieving within their social and political life few forms of authority
which can both satisfy their need to reassert a historic self-confidence
and also provide the basis for re-ordering their society in modern
terms." 24
Thus, Pye concluded that it was impossible for the Chinese government to advance national political development, because they could
not meet the essential requirements to penetrate more thoroughly into
22. S.N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (N.Y.: Free Press, 1963), p. 323.
23. Ibid., pp. 325-326.
24. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics, supra note 4, p. 5.
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the society and mobilizing human and material resources more extensively than had been possible in the traditional system, so long as the
Chinese were experiencing such an authority crisis.
We found there were two main issues in the three studies just
summarized. Moore and Eisenstadt all focus on the lack of dynamic
oriented change inherent in traditional Chinese social and political
structures which then made any contemporary progressive change impossible. Pye emphasized the special importance of the authority crisis after contact with the West in the transitional period. In turn, Pye
argued, such an authority crisis made the government unable to advance any political and economic developments of their own. Since
political modernization is now generally regarded as the most urgent
task in the whole process of modernization in the non-Western societies the studies on Chinese political structure in relation to modernization is, therefore, greatly welcomed.
The theoretical arguments found in Moore and Eisenstadt's respective work did not really go any farther than Weber's work which
we mentioned earlier. What Moore and Eisenstadt really achieved, if
any, is their attempts to narrow their focuses particularly to political
and legal systems in traditional China, while Weber looked at a much
general level of value system in traditional China.
There are some difficulties in Eisenstadt's theory of "accommodable change" of traditional Chinese society. First of all, he did not
give us any satisfactory reason why accommodable change existed
only in China, not other societies; he simply said that the pressure of
integrative harmony was too strong for any total change in social and
political structures to occur in China. Secondly, he also did not show
us how China could maintain integration for such a long time or if
there was any significant structural feature in the Chinese political system that contributed to such an integration in traditional China.
Sociologically, for the purpose of studying change and modernization, it seems to me, it would be very interesting to find out how
China was able to avoid total change during her long history. In other
words, what mechanisms were used in China to sustain its political
and social systems functionally intact? For instance, the bureaucratic
system of recruitment can be seen as a system-maintenance mechanism against total change in society. By requiring a complete memorizing of Confucian Classics without argument or question, the
government was able to indoctrinate the traditional norms and ideology into every potential government official as the only line of thinking
and way of doing things. Similarly, the strict practice of Confucian
ideology, which was required for the promotion and upward mobility
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within the official bureaucracy, also contributed to political integration
in traditional China. They reduced the possible change of any deviant
thought and behavior, and thus, revolution, among political leaders in
the traditional Chinese society.
In general, I would agree with Pye's main argument of the crisis
of authority responsible for the government's inability to mobilize
China's resources for modernization. But his "identity crisis" bothers
me. I do not believe the Chinese have ever doubted who they were
during this period of social and political crisis in the 19th and 20th
centuries. For the majority of Chinese, it was a question of Chinese
against foreigners, not the Chinese against the Chinese. To them, the
Manchu rulers and Westerners were both foreigners. Being against
the Manchu government did not mean being against the Chinese
themselves. 25
The authority crisis emanating from such a political struggle resulted in the failure of the Chinese themselves to establish an efficient
centralized government to deal with the challenge from the West. For
instance, the revolutionary party of Dr. Sun Yat-sen before 1911 never
admitted that the Manchus were Chinese. The party leaders believed
that the Manchus were foreigners and barbarians and that they were
responsible for the failure of system-maintenance and for the failure of
creating an effective coping mechanism to deal with these crises. In
fact, the leaders were convinced that they could solve the crisis situation themselves because they, as true Chinese, knew and understood
the problems much better than the Manchu rulers. Thus, it is very
unlikely that crisis in China resulted from the national identity crisis,
as Pye has suggested.
On the contrary, the problems in China at that time were quite
similar to those in other colonial societies-the problem of standing
against colonial rulers, the problem of national independence, and so
forth. Following this line of argument, one question might be of interest: why did the authority crisis not disappear in China after the successful revolution in 1911? One possible way to study this problem, it
seems to me, is to analyze the ideological and political backgrounds of
the Chinese political modernization leadership in the post-1911 period. It is evident that conflicts between traditional and modernization
political leaders created a tremendous impediment to a smooth and
well-planned social and political transformation in China. Nowhere
25. Wen-hui Tsai, Patterns of Political Elite Mobility in Modern China, 1912-1949
(Hong Kong: Chinese Materials Center, 1983).
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does Pye make a serious attempt to analyze China in terms of a theory
that applied to transitional societies as a whole.
More serious is the methodology upon which Pye develops his
theoretical generalization. Although what he has said may very well
be true, he offers no assurance of validity beyond his own expertise in
the field; no empirical work is presented. The basis of his whole argument, as a matter of fact, was his own personal experience of growing
up in China. He also claimed that in this psychological oriented study
of political culture, he did not need to be concerned with questions
about the actual distribution of attitude and feelings throughout the
Chinese population. The personal bias inherent in this work is most
unfortunate.

4.

External Factors in Chinese Modernization

Although most studies have generally agreed that the Chinese
contacts with the West have had a significant impact on the process of
Chinese modernization, very few systematic studies have been done in
this respect. In fact, Western scholars seem very reluctant to admit
that Western political economic, and military interference in the nineteenth century created a tremendously difficult situation for the Chinese to work on their developmental projects independently from the
West.
Most of these cholars 26 argue that the contacts with the West
should have given China an advantageous opportunity from the West,
but China failed to do so. For instance, Levy argued that China would
have had an even better chance than Japan, because the Western countries had invested more capital in China than in Japan, and therefore,
China should have been able to utilize more Western capital in its
investment on modernization, as compared with Japan. 27
Both Levy and other scholars who took the same stand with him
failed to realize the fact that Chinese economic programs in the late
19th and early 20th centuries were under a great restriction from the
West because of the Chinese economic dependence on the West. Historical evidence can be found that on several occasions Chinese developmental plans were rejected by the Western money-lenders whenever
those plans were in conflict with the latter's. The Chinese had almost
no freedom to do anything without permission from the West. Francis
26. E.g., Marion J. Levy, Jr., Modernization and the Structure of Societies (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970). John K. Fairbank and Ssu-yu Teng, eds., China's
Response to the West (N.Y.: Atheum Press, 1963).
27. Levy, Modernization and the Structure of Societies, supra note 26.
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L.K. Hsu once said it sadly: "Since the middle of the nineteenth century China has never had the freedom of pondering its own way and
moving at its own pace." 28
A similar viewpoint was expressed in Frances V. Moulder's comparison of modernization between Japan and China. Moulder sees
that .there was no strong effort by the Western nations in the 19th
century to incorporate Japan's dependencies because of its small market for trade and investment which enabled Japan to develop its own
strategies for development. But in China, the Western capitalist nations developed a large staple trade with China and the assumption of
the power of China's government which led to the dismantling of the
already weak imperial state. As a result, according to Moulder, Japan
enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy in its development, while
China's dependency on the Western nations undermined its efforts in
modernization in the 19th century. 29
It is certainly very naive to blame either the West or the Chinese
alone for the failure of China's modernization, even though the external forces in China at that time were very crucial. What is needed is a
systematic analysis of both the advantages and disadvantages of the
western impact on China, institutionally as well as psychologically.
In summary, our review of the western theories of Chinese modernization has found that most studies and theories on this subject
tend to be fragmentary as well as narrow-minded, for too much emphasis is often put on a certain limited aspect of the Chinese social
structure while ignoring all the others. Weber's study of Chinese
traditional religion, Bellah's examination of traditional value system,
Levy's work on the role and functions of the family, the respective
works of Eisenstadt, Pye, and Moore on the Chinese political system,
and Moulder's analysis of foreign external forces in China all pose a
common problem that they are too narrow in scope to be able to explain the complexity of the Chinese modernization process. Moreover, all the above mentioned theories are developed by western
scholars who are not personally involved in China's modernization experience. In the next section, we shall turn to the various competing
views offered by Chinese intellectuals on the fate of Chinese
modernization.
28. Francis L.K. Hsu, Under the Ancestors' Shadow (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday,
1967), p. X.
29. Frances V. Moulder, Japan, China and the Modern World Economy (N.Y. Cambridge University Press, 1979) pp. 200-201.
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CHINESE VIEWS ON MODERNIZATION EFFORT

The idea of change and reform has been discussed among Chinese
intellectuals ever since the mid-19th century, and yet, according to
Fairbank and Teng, "the process of ideological change in modern
China had to begin with the reinterpretation of the Chinese heritage,
rather than with its denial and rejection." 30 Shocked by domestic rebellions and foreign invasions, the Chinese scholar-officials suddenly
realized the possibility of the fall of the Empire and the necessity of
searching for a proper path to a strong new China. The radicals were
for jettisoning the whole traditional system, while the conservatives
clung to their hope of a Confucian revival. The radicals were very few
in number, whereas the conservatives were the great majority of Chinese intellectuals and, more importantly, were strongly sympathized
with by the Imperial Court in the mid-nineteenth century. The 1860s
T'ung-Chih Restoration was one of the great attempts of the conservatives. The great aim of the T'ung-Chih Restoration was the revival of
Confucian values and institutions which the conservatives regarded as
superior to the western barbarian values and institutions, and which
could stabilize popular sentiment and integrate the great Chinese nation. Led by T'seng Kuo-fan the Chinese conservatives re-examined
Confucian values and institutions in great detail in order to recreate a
modified theory which could be fit into Chinese social and political
situations at the time. The program of the restoration involved finance, the civil service, law, and ethical morality, as well as foreign
policy.
The assumption in such a self-examination of the traditional Confucian theory was that peace and stability could be achieved through
the restoration of the traditional heritage. The Chinese conservatives
were convinced that Chinese history during the past three thousand
years has shown several successful reforms through such a "return to
the old way." However, the Chinese conservatives in the mid-nineteenth century failed to realize the complexity of the social and political situations in relation to the internal unrest and foreign
aggressions. The traditional theory of a cyclical change was not only
invalid for the modern period, but also complete inadequate; progress
forward now must be taken into consideration. It is not enough
merely to restore the best of the ancient Chinese values and institutions but it is necessary to have a far-reaching plan of modernization
in which China may find a place in the large universe. The lack of
such a foundation made the failure of the "T'ung-Chih Restoration"
30. Fairbank and Teng., eds., China's Response to the West. supra note 26, p. 7.
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movement inevitable. Wright said, "The country became weaker than
stronger: sycophants filled the posts lately held by the great Restoration statement; and the successful foreign policy of the sixties gave
way to an era of ever more humiliating treaties, loss ofterritory, andin all but name-loss of sovereignty itself." 31
The ideological consequence of the failure of the "T'ung-Chih
Restoration" is apparent: the conservatives lost their confidence on
the old theory, whereas the radicals sought revolution as the only solution to save China. Although there were several attempts toward a
smooth reform in the late-nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the revolution finally broke out in October 1911. Dr. Sun Yatsan and his revolutionary group overthrew the old Manchus Empire
and established a new Republic, the first in China's long history.
The Chinese modernizing elite, those foreign educated Chinese
young intellectuals in particular, were quite understandably enthusiastic about the success of the Republican revolution and saw it as the
beginning of a new era in China's return to world respectability. Unfortunately, their dream of a stronger and better China soon became a
nightmare as China after the revolution fell into the hands of a group
of warlords with endless civil wars while the threat of a Japanese dominance endangering China's independence became more and more real
and unbearable. The fate of China's future thus became the central
focus of a furious debate among the Chinese intellectuals in the postrevolutionary China.
The currents of Chinese ideological thought in the post-1912 period are too complicated to be easily classified. For the purpose of our
discussion here we may classify the Chinese intellectuals of the period
into two major groups: the modernizing elite and the traditional elite.
The Modernizing elite are those reformers who attempt to adopt western values and institutions into Chinese society in order to establish a
new modern China. Within this group of modernizing elite, it is also
necessary to differentiate the liberals who prefer the gradual transformation of Chinese modernization through education and other peaceful methods, and the leftists who are communists and/or socialists in
favor of radical political action to achieve the goal of modernization in
China.
The Confucians were the other major group of Chinese intellectuals in the post-1912 period. These traditional elite insisted that the
traditional Confucian values and institutions were superior and thus
31. Mary L. Wright, The Last Stand a/Chinese Conservatism (N.Y.: Atheum, 1967),
p. 299.
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must be preserved in China; they believed that China can be a strong
nation based on a rebuilt Confucian theory. Some of the traditional
elite even declared that someday the Confucian theory will regain its
glory in the world when the Western materialistic civilization
collapses.
It is certainly significant to note here, nevertheless, that many
Chinese leaders of the period at one time or another had a foot in
either group. And events have moved so rapidly in twentiety-century
China that by clinging to certain views a radical might find himself
soon grown conservative.
1.

Hu Shih and the Modernizing Elite

The central figure in the modernizing elite at the early Republican period after the 1911 revolution was Dr. Hu Shih, an American
educated professor of philosophy at Peking University. Hu Shih argued the current crisis in modern Chinese society is mainly the result
of the great mistake made by traditional Confucianism. He attacked
the Chinese worship of meaning, the filial piety symbolism, and Confucian classical education as not fitting into the present-day Chinese
society.
For Hu Shih, civilization is an evolutionary process of imitation.
"The greatest period of a race is the period of imitating others." Hu
said, "When a race does not learn from others, the race is going to
decline. The greatest age of China were the periods in which we sincerely tried to learn from the others. The great capacity for imitation
in the Japanese race has made Japan a great nation. On the other
hand, Chinese traditions do not fit into present-day society at all.
There is no other way to save China from destruction than to imitate
others ... We have to learn from others with whole heart. We have
to imitate them. We have to learn how to educate people to kick out
our stupidity, how to operate machines to conquer nature for human
happiness, and how to establish efficient systems for business, industry, and even politics." 32
Hu Shih argued that the civilization of a race is simply the sumtotal of its achievement in adjusting itself to its environment. Success
or failure in that adjustment depends upon the ability of the race to
use intelligence for the invention of necessary effective tools. Advancement in civilization depends upon the improvement of tools.
Thus, the difference between Eastern and Western civilizations is pri32. Shih Hu, Collected Essays of Hu Shih (Taipei: Commercial Books, 1953), vol. 3, p.
23.
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marily a difference in the tools used. He said, "Every tool of civilization is produced by human intelligence making use of the matter and
energy in the natural world for the satisfaction of a want, a desire, an
aesthetic feeling or an intellectual curiosity." And, "there is no such
thing as a purely material civilization. " 33
The material civilization and spiritual civilization are not two
contradictory concepts, they are in fact the two manifestations of
human civilization, we do not merely mean the physical object but
also the human intelligence used in its creation. Hu Shih deeply believed that the spiritual civilization must be built on the foundation of
material progress. As a matter of fact, no spiritual civilization can be
achieved without the satisfaction of material civilization. He said,
"The great tragedy of our human world is that many people worked
hard all their lives without achieving a minimal human happiness." 34
He asked, "What spiritualism is there in a civilization which tolerates
such a terrible form of human slavery as the rickshaw coolie? Do we
seriously believe that there can be any spiritual life left in those poor
human beasts of burden who run and toil and sweat under that peculiar bondage of slavery which knews neither the minimum wage nor
any limit of working hours?" 35 And, thus, he argued that "there is not
much spirituality in a civilization which bound the feet of its women
for almost a thousand years without a protest, nor in that other civilizations (India) which long tolerated the practice of suttee or cremation
of widows and has maintained the horrible caste-system to this day." 36
According to Hu Shih, modern Western civilization is built on
the following concepts: (a) The purpose of human life is to .search for
happiness, (b) thus, poverty is a sin, and (c) thus, illness is a sin. He
said, "It is because poverty is a sin that men have to develop natural
resources, to encourage production, to improve manufacture, and to
improve human heredity. And finally, it is because the purpose of
human life is to search for happiness that we want to have a comfortable living, a convenient transportation, a clean city, beautiful arts, a
safe society, and good politics." 37 Therefore, he said, there is no doubt
that "modern technology is highly spiritual because it seeks, through
33. Shih Hu, "The Civilizations of the East and the West," in C.A. Beard, ed., Whither
Mankind (N.Y.: Longmans, Green & Co., 1928), pp. 25-27.
34. Shih Hu, Hu Shih and the Sino-Western Cultures (Taipei: Waterbaffalo Publisher,
1967), p. 55.
35. Hu, "The Civilizations of the East and the West," supra note 33, pp. 28-29.
36. Ibid., p. 40.
37. Shih Hu, The Diary of Hu Shih's Studies in the Abroad (Taipei: Far East Books,
1959), p. 56.
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human ingenuity and intelligence, to release human energy from the
unnecessary hardships of life and provide for it the necessary conditions for the enjoyment of life. Whatever by the use men may make of
the resultant comfort and leisure, the relief of suffering and hardship is
in itself spiritual." 38
Another characteristic of modern Western civilization is science.
The spirit of science is to search for truth. It is truth that can release
the human being from environmental, cultural, and superstitious sufferings to become a strong, intelligent, and free man. Hu Shih pointed
out that "it was science and the new technology which restored to man
the sense of self-confidence and created the modern civilization of the
West . . . . A whole recognition of the material satisfaction is one of
the significant characteristics in modern Western civilization. " 39 And
"if the priests of the Medieval Age were justly canonized as saints,
Galileo, Watt, Stephenson, Morse, Bell, Edison, and Ford certainly
deserve to be honored as gods and enshrined with Prometheus and
Cadmus. They represent that which is most divine in man, namely,
that creative intelligence which provides implements and makes civilization possible." 40
The spirit of science also relies on its skepticism. Science teaches
us not to despair of the infinity of knowledge for it is only through
piecemeal accumulation of fragmentary information that we can hope
to arrive at some knowledge of nature at all. Every piecemeal acquisition is progress, and every little step in advance gives the worker a
genuinely spiritual rapture. Hu Shih said, "The most spiritual element
in science is its skepticism, its courage to doubt everything and believe
nothing without sufficient evidence. This attitude is not merely negative, although on the negative side it has performed very great service
in liberating the human mind from slavish subjection to superstition
and authority. The attitude of doubt is essentially constructive and
creative: it is the only legitimate road to belief; it aims at conquering
doubt itself and establishing belief on a new basis. It has not only
fought the old belief with the irresistible weapon, 'Give me evidence,'
but also raised new problems and led to new discoveries by the same
insistence on evidence."41 For Hu Shih, it is this spirit of "creative
doubt" which has made progress of science and the greatness of modern Western civilization.
38. Hu, "The Civilizations of the East and the West," supra note 33, p. 34.
39. Shih Hu, The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China (Taipei:
Academia Sinica, 1969), p. 56.
40. Hu, "The Civilizations of the East and the West," supra note 33, p. 27.
41. Ibid., p. 37.
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One significant consequence of the great achievement in science
in Western civilization is the emergence of a new religion which Hu
Shih called "The Religion of Democracy." He said, "Modern civilization did not begin with religion, but it has resulted in a new religion; it
did not much trouble about morals, but it has achieved a new system
of morals." 42 The basic idea of this modern religion is, Hu Shih said,
that "we trust man rather than Heaven; we depend on ourselves rather
than God; we do not want to imagine what is the Heaven, we want to
build a human paradise in this world; we do not want to become an
eternal deity, we want to be a happy and healthy man in this world; we
do not want to think about religious philosophy, we want to be an
intelligent man to improve this world; we will not easily believe God's
ability, but we do believe in the capacity of scientific techniques and
the future of our human being is not limited; we will not believe the
eternity of soul but we will believe the greatness of human character
and of human right." 43
The development of the religion of democracy has its historical
significance. The Industrial Revolution opened up the possibility of
the emergence of such a religion. Hu said, "With the increase in material enjoyment and the rise of a large middle class, there has been simultaneously an expansion in man's imaginative power and sympathy.
And with the restoration of man's confidence in himself as the agent to
control his own destinies, there have developed the various types of
social consciousness and social virtues. All this leads to the rise of the
new religion of democracy, by which I mean to include the individualistic ideals of the eighteenth century and the socialistic ideals of the
last hundred years." 44 The ideals of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity,
which were widely spread in the European continent, he said, "have
become the war-cry of the American Revolution, the French revolution, and the revolution of 1848, and have vibrated through all the
later revolutions. " 45
The ideals of the religion of democracy have worked themselves
into the constitutions of the new republics. They have brought about
the downfall of monarchies, empires, and aristocracies. They have
given to man equality before the law and freedom of thought, speech,
publication, and religious belief. And they have emancipated the women and made universal education a reality. Hu said, "This religion
of democracy which not only guarantees one's own liberty ... but also
42. Ibid., p. 37.
43. Hu, Collected Essays of Hu Shih, vol. 3, supra note 32, p. 10.

•44. Hu, "The Civilizations of the East and the West," supra note 33, p. 38.
45. Ibid., p. 38.
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endeavors to make it possible for every man and woman to live a free
life; which not only succeeds through science and machinery in greatly
enhancing the happiness and comfort of the individual, but also seeks
through organization and legislation to extend the goods of life to the
greatest number-this is the greatest spiritual heritage of the Western
civilization. " 46
Hu Shih made very clear the need of a psychological prerequisite
in the process of Chinese modernization. He said, "Today if we are
going to try investigate how to solve the problems of Chinese society,
we have to reexamine our attitude towards these problems first ....
We should reexamine ourselves: why did we fail? why is our national
salvation movement still a failure today? There are still many people
who do not believe our nation and race are sick. . . . Others do not try
hard to cure our sickness." 47 The self-examination of Chinese traditions, according to Hu Shih, does not only require a new mentality but
also a recognition of all the mistakes the Chinese have made, "There
were several major events in recent Chinese history such as the SinoJapan War in 1894, the Russian occupation of Li Hsung Harbor, the
Boxer incident, etc., we reacted to these incidents strongly each time,
but we have never achieved our goal to save China."48
It is, therefore, the duty of the leaders, especially political leaders,
to show what the problems are and how to solve them. Hu Shih said,
"Often we do not think seriously what kind of society and nation we
want to have, and often we are also not willing to think about the
direction which can lead us to reach the destination. Consequently, if
somebody says left, we go left; others say right, we go right. If our
leaders have great experience in world affairs, and if our leaders lead
us with their eyes open, we may be able to reach the destination by
following them. However, if they are blind, then we will be in great
danger." 49
History has told us that Chinese political leaders have failed to
direct us to build a better nation. People also have lost their faith too.
It is now the responsibility of Chinese modem intellectuals to take
over the leadership and to call attention to the mistake made by those
political leaders. Hu Shih said, "We must open our eyes to find the
right direction. We do not want to follow those blind leaders .... Our
duty is that we will use our knowledge to observe objectively the true
needs of the present-day China in order to decide our goal. We first
46.
47.
48.
49.

Ibid., p. 40.
Hu, Collected Essays of Hu Shih, vol. l, supra note 32, p. 430.
Ibid., p. 451.
Ibid., p. 430.
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want to ask what have to be destroyed, which is a negative goal. Then
we are going to ask what we want to build, which is our positive
goal." 50 Hu Shih's solution to the problem is simple: wholesale
westernization.
Hu Shih then called for a wholesale and wholehearted westernization in China. He said:
My own attitude is that we must unreservedly accept this
modern civilization of the West because we need it to solve
our most pressing problems, the problems of poverty, ignorance, disease and corruption. These are the real enemies we
are facing, and none of these can be subjugated by the old
civilization. . . . And I am convinced the old traditions will
not be lost even when we take an extreme view of the need
for modernization, because civilizations are conservative by
their nature. By the natural inertia of cultures, the vast majority will take good care of those traditional values. But it
behooves the leaders to go as far as they can in order that
they may bring the masses to move a few steps farther in the
direction of solving the most urgent problems of the nation
by means of every instrumentality which this new civilization can offer. 51
Although the common goal of the Chinese modernizing elite in
the period was the same: westernization in China, the methods of
achieving this common goal were quite different in various groups of
the modernizing elite. Conflicts of opinion rapidly developed over the
ideological reconstruction of Chinese life. The doctrines of socialism,
anarchism, nationalism, and communism were widely spread among
Chinese modernizing elite in the period.
In such an atmosphere, Hu Shih's advocacy of "wholesale westernization" inevitably received both praise and challenge from Chinese
modernizing elite. One of the strong supporters of Hu Shih's proposal
was Professor Chen Hsu-Ching. In his various articles and books,
Chen strongly agreed with Hu's opinion that the future of the Chinese
civilization must rely on a thorough westernization. In his "The Future of Chinese Civilization," Chen indicated two major reasons for a
thorough wholesale westernization in China: first, western civilization
is indeed more progressive than the Chinese; and second, western
modern civilization is the symbol of the modem world, no matter
50. Ibid., p. 436.
51. Shih Hu, "Conflict of Culture," in B. Lasker and W.L. Holland, eds., Problems of
the Pacific, 1931 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 477.
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whether the Chinese accept it or not. Chen argued that the duty of
human beings was not to preserve but to create civilization. He said,
"The past civilization was a creation of our ancestors. But since the
time and environment have been changed, we therefore have to create
a new civilization to adjust to them. Otherwise, our race will become
weaker and finally disappear." 52 Thus, the adoption of western civilization will not destroy Chinese traditional heritage completely; the latter will retain its position in Chinese history as part of the world
civilization.
However, Hu's proposal for a wholesale westernization faced a
great challenge from other modernizing elite. The first came from
professor Pan Kuan-tan, a sociologist at Yan Ching university. Pan
expressed his agreement with a wholehearted modernization but not
with a wholesale westernization. But the main critical challenge came
from two other groups among modernizing elite: the moderate liberals, and the leftists. For the moderate liberals, Hu's idea was too radical; but for the leftists it was too conservative.
The view of the moderate liberals was presented in a widely circulated manifesto, "Reconstruction of Civilization on a Chinese Base,"
issued by ten distinguished professors, including Sa Meng-wu, T'ao
Hsi-sheng, Ho Ping-sheng, and Huang Wen-hsan on January 10, 1935.
The professor declared that they objected both to traditionalism and to
blind imitation, and advocated preservation of the tradition with the
addition of western learning according to the immediate needs of
China. They indicated that in the process of reconstruction everyone
should recognize that (1) China is China. She has her own peculiarity,
(2) To either praise or criticize traditional Chinese values and institutions is useless. The Chinese must reexamine their own tradition in
order to preserve the best of it, (3) To adopt western civilization is
necessary; but the adoption should be based on the needs of presentday China, and not accept everything, (4) The reconstruction of civilization on a Chinese base is to help Chinese people to catch up the
West and to contribute to the world civilization, and (5) When the
Chinese reconstruct themselves to be an integrated nation, then, they
can help the world. Therefore, the reconstruction of civilization in
China, according to the professors, must be "not to be conservative,
and not be blind in following others. Based on Chinese civilization, we
use scientific methods with a critical attitude to reexamine the past, to
52. Hsi-ching Chen, The Future of Chinese Culture (Shanghai: Commercial Books,
1934), p. 103.
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preserve the present, and to create the future." 53
In short, what these ten professors suggested is a selective assimilation; they want to keep the best part of the traditional heritage and
to mix it with the best of western civilization. Such a viewpoint is not
new at all in China, according to Hu Shih. He said in his reply to the
ten professors, "In their manifesto, the professors expressed their dissatisfaction with earlier attempts by Ch'ing scholars to combine Chinese classics and Western technology. Although they spoke in a
different way, their spirit was the same as Chang Chih-tung in the
nineteenth century." 54 The fundamental mistake these professors
made, according to Hu Shih, is that they did not realize the nature of
cultural change. Hu indicated that the common characteristics of cultural change are (1) Civilization per se is conservative. The civilization of a race has a great conservative nature which can correct the
deviant patterns within it on the one hand, while resisting the invasion
of foreign civilizations on the other, (2) The contact of two different
civilizations will eliminate some parts of a civilization which are not
useful any more, (3) In the process of such change, there is no standard criteria which can be taken to decide what part we want to keep
and what we want to give away, (4) There is a limit on the process of
cultural change. It is completely impossible to destroy the fundamental conservatism in a civilization. Regardless of changes in life, Chinese will still be Chinese. Hu Shih then urged that "Chinese modern
leaders should not worry about the crisis of the Chinese base, but
about the conservatism of the traditional Chinese civilization. The crisis is not the non-appearance of their characteristics of Chinese political organization, social institutions, and ideological thoughts such as
these ten professors worried about; what we should worry now is that
there are just too many bad traditions in the Chinese political organization, social institutions, and ideological thoughts. Therefore, we
must accept the world civilization of science and technology, and the
spirit behind it. We should let this world civilization have free contact
with our traditional civilization. The final consequence of such a contact is undoubtedly a Chinese based civilization." 55
According to Hu Shih, the result of the contact of Chinese and
Western civilization will not be the complete dismissal of Chinese
traditional civilization but the emergence of a new Chinese civilization
having modern world characteristics including both Chinese and west53. Meng-wu Sa, et al., "Reconstruction of Civilization on a Chinese Base" (no publisher listed).
54. Hu, Hu Shih and the Sino- Western Cultures, supra note 34, p. 135.
55. Ibid., pp. 135-136.
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em traits. The difference between Hu Shih and other professors, thus,
lay in their method of modernization in China. Since for Hu Shih,
reformers should go as far as possible in order to eliminate the inadequacy of traditional civilization; a wholesale westernization is only a
beginning; the final stage in a new Chinese civilization having both
Chinese and Western characteristics. For the ten professors, the reformers have to be careful not to lose their heads in the process of
modernization; everything has to be planned from the beginning. The
Chinese must reexamine their tradition in order to preserve the best
part of it and to accept the best part of Western civilization in terms of
China's need.
Another criticism of Hu Shih and his followers came from the
leftists which included socialists and communists such as Chen Tuhsiu and Li Ta-chao. Although Hu Shih shared with the leftists the
belief that the problem of China can only be solved by a thorough
westernization, the ideologies and methods of reform of Hu and the
leftists were quite different. Ideologically, Hu Shih emphasized
strongly Dewey's experimentalism and Huxley's skepticism, while the
leftists evoked Marxism and the dialectic method in the analysis of
Chinese social and political problems. Hu Shih and his followers were
convinced that the problems of China could not be solved altogether,
but must be tackled individually. They insisted that there was no single prescription which could cure every kind of disease. Only through
education and the proper approach to practical problems can China be
modernized. Hu Shih and his followers strongly believed that revolution was not necessary; a gradual reform in every aspect of society in
terms of a far-reaching plan was what China needed at the time. In
"Our Political Aims," Hu and his followers said, "We deeply believe
that the worst disease of China is that planning is a necessary condition for efficiency; and that even an ordinary plan is better than nothing.... We want to have a government of constitution, of publicity,
and of planning .... In order to reach this aim, we suggest that (1) a
peace conference be held between south and north; (2) peace talks
must be based on the reestablishment of the Congress; (3) the size of
the army be reduced; (4) the number of government officials be reduced; (5) the election system be improved; and (6) a public and wellplanned finance be maintained. " 56
Thus, it is clear what Hu Shih and his followers suggested is not
the overthrow of the Chinese government through violence. Rather it
is a plan for gradual reform on different levels of the political and
56. Hu, Collected Essays of Hu Shih, supra note 32, pp. 141-143.
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social systems in China at the time. Meanwhile, Hu and his followers
thought it was too early for China to have a national democracy;
China must practice democracy on a small-scale basis first, i.e., on a
local or provincial level, before the development of a national democracy. During this initial stage, Chinese politics must not rely on any
political party; it would be best for the country to be without any organized party.
Such a political point of view immediately received criticism from
both Chen Tu-hsiu and his communist comrades. In an article, "My
Opinion on Contemporary Chinese Political Problems," Chen accused
Hu and Hu's supporters of not understanding the true factors of Chinese political conflicts. Chen pointed out that the Chinese political
conflict was due to the independence of warlords in each province, and
the failure to control these warlords by the central government.
Therefore, the proposal for a local democracy would create more
problems than it solved in this situation. Chen said, "My solution for
the present-day Chinese political problems is to organize a strong
political party in order to destroy the warlords, to establish an integrated nation, and to guard against the international imperialism.
Only through such a method, can China be a true independent
nation. " 57
Similar criticism is also indicated in a manifesto issued by the
Chinese communist organization, "The Chinese Communists' Proposal on the Political Situation." The communists labeled Hu's proposal
as a compromise between pacifism and capitalism. The communists
wanted to have immediate action directed toward the final goal of
revolution. The educational process and gradual reform were for
them too slow to have any effect.
While Hu Shih and his followers took the student movement in
1925 as a great achievement of the educational and cultural movement, the leftists regarded it as the symbol of the direct political struggle between the government and the people. And while the liberals
remained in the academic circle to advocate freedom of thought and
expression, the leftists went out on the street to organize workers and
students to protect the government's policy in domestic and foreign
affairs.
2.

Hu Shih and Chinese Traditional Elite
As has just been discussed, the debate between Hu Shih and the

57. Chen's article is included in Hu Shih's 1953 publication, Collected Essays of Hu
Shih, supra note 32, pp. 119-128.
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other modernizing elite was focused mainly on the proper ideological
foundation and the methods of modernization in China. The argument between the modernizing and traditional elites was, however,
concerned with the role of Confucianism in society in the age of crisis.
Hu and the other modernizing elite pointed out clearly the inadequacy
of Confucian values and institutions in the process of Chinese modernization; and the Confucian six classics were not capable of educating
Chinese youth on the one hand or of creating a new leadership on the
other.
Although the traditional elite did not give Hu Shih and the other
modernizing elite any serious or fatal challenge on the latter's search
for Chinese modernization, there were some older intellectuals such as
Liang Shu-ming, and Ku Hung-ming, who raised the matter of resisting the acceptance of western civilization. Their arguments on
maintaining the Chinese tradition were supported later by Liang Chichao, a famous scholar and earlier reformer who had changed his attitude after a visit to Europe in 1919, where he saw the collapse of western scientific civilization during and after the World War I. For Liang
Chi-chao, the war in Europe was clear evidence of a basic social intellectual malaise in the West which stemmed from its blind worship of
science. He said,
Those who praised the omnipotence of science had hoped
previously that as soon as science succeeded, the golden age
would appear forthwith. Now science is successful indeed;
material progress in the West in the last one hundred years
has greatly surpassed the achievements of the three thousand
years prior to this period. Yet we human beings have not
secured happiness; on the contrary, science gives us catastrophes. . . . The Europeans have dreamed a vast dream of omnipotence of science; not they decry its bankruptcy. This is a
major turning-point in the world thought. 58
Therefore, Liang believed that the Chinese would assume great
responsibilities in the reconstruction of world civilization. "Oh, our
lovable youths!" said Liang, "Attention! March On! Millions of people on the other shore of the ocean are worrying about the bankruptcy
of material civilization, sorrowfully and desperately crying for help,
waiting for your aid. Our ancestors in Heaven, the Sage, and the older
generations are all earnestly hoping you will carry out their task.
58. Chi-ch'ao Liang, Yin-ping shih wen-chi [Collected Works of Liang Chi-ch'ao]
(Taipei: Chung-hwa Books, 1967), p. 328.
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Their spirit is helping you!" 59 But in order to contribute to world civilization, Liang pointed out that Chinese youth must love and respect
their own civilization first.
A stronger view of traditionalism came from Liang Shu-ming, a
professor of Chinese philosophy. In his book, Eastern and Western
Civilizations and Their Philosophies, and his article, "The Final Awakening of the Chinese People's Self-Salvation Movement," Liang Shuming attempted to develop a new formulation of Confucianism. He
tried to show that the Chinese civilization was relevant to the modern
world. According to him, Western civilization sought satisfaction
from the external world and from other people; the Chinese attitude
was one of harmonization and satisfaction through adjustment; and
the Indian attitude was escapist. The failure of the western civilization
in World War I indicated it would give way to the Chinese, resulting
in a higher world civilization which would mold the scientific and material successes of its predecessor to mass intellectual, moral, and ethical nature. On the problem of China, he argued that because China
was different from Western nations, it would be wrong to import such
Western political systems as democracy and communism. Liang said,
"The foundation of a race is its spirit. To give up one's own spirit
would result in destroying one's future. The future and the new life
are developed on this spiritual basis which can not be imported from
outside and be devalued. One should hold its own position to develop
its characters." 60
The third influential traditional defendant was Ku Hung-ming.
Ku was an European-educated scholar. He had a M.A. degree from a
university in England; he had the experience of living in several European nations; and he also knew many European languages. Compared
with Liang Chi-chao and Liang Shu-ming, Ku's ideals were even more
conservative and critical. Essentially, Ku's defense of traditional Confucian values emerged from his criticism of Western civilization. His
argument rarely touched on Western technology. His central focus
was the moral aspect of life. According to Ku, Confucian values were
immortal while Western civilization would not last for long, the Westem political and legal systems were based on the concepts of right and
obligation which were not good enough to keep society at peace. Ku
characterized the Chinese people as deep, broad, simple, and possessed
of a "Divine Duty of Loyalty." The moral emphasis in Confucianism
59. Ibid., p. 328.
60. Shu-min Liang, East- West Civilizations and their Philosophies (Shanghai: Commercial Books, 1921 ), p. 100.
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made Chinese society peaceful for several thousand years. The essential problem of China's survival today, according to Ku, is not technology but morality. The future of China relies on her moral, not her
material development. He then accused the modernizing elite failed to
realize such an essential problem in China while begging for the help
of the West in attempting to solve China's own problem.
In summary, the Chinese intellectual's view on modernization in
China were largely defensive in nature. The modernizing elite promoted modernization in an effort to upgrade China's respectability,
while the traditional elite resisted modernization with the aim of the
preservation of traditional Confucianism.
IV.

FOUR MAJOR DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES

In Chinese usage, the word "modernization" was first referred to
as the process of imitation and adoption of the western model of technological development. Later, the extent of modernization was expanded to include the upgradings of the traditional Chinese socioeconomic-political system to be compatible with the societal growth in
the contemporary era.
Historically, the Chinese modernization process can be divided
into four major developmental stages, each with its own distinguished
characteristics. They are (I) Involuntary and Defensive Westernization, 1840-1895, (II) Reform and Revolution, 1896-1911,
(III) Authority Crisis and Disorganization, 1912-1948, and
(IV) Communist vs. Capitalist approaches, 1949 to the present.
(I) Involuntary and Defensive Westernization-the first stage in
the Chinese modernization process is distinguished by the involuntary
Chinese acceptance of Western technological superiority. The period
begins with the Opium War in 1840 and ends with the defeat in the
Sino-Japanese War in 1895. In general, modernization was seen in
this stage as a cause for destruction and discontent. Several international and domestic events at the time have contributed in making the
Chinese awareness of Western superiority and the painful acceptance
of Western technology.
In international affairs, we saw the frequent defeats of the Chinese
at the hands of Western nations and Japan. During this period, China
had wars with almost every major power in the West and with Japan.
The treaties signed with foreign nations include the following:
a) 1842 The Treaty of Nanking, signed with English.
b) 1858 The Treaties of Tientsin, signed with EnglishFrance allied forces.
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c)

1860 The Treaties of Peking, signed with English-France
allied forces.
d) 1881 The Treaty of IIi, signed with Russia.
e) 1895 The Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shimonoseki.
After each defeat, China had to grant privileges of trade and concede
part of its territory to the winning nations. Moreover, China sustained
a great loss of sovereignty by permitting foreign war vessels and commercial ships to navigate rivers in the interior, by the clause allowing
consular jurisdiction, by allowing foreign missionaries to buy land in
the interior, and by permitting a settlement zone for foreigners in major cities.
At the same time, troubles in China's extraordinary vast countryside grew in size and became uncontrollable. Suffering from the political corruption of Manchu Court, from foreign interference with their
traditional way of life and from natural disasters that frequently occurred during the period, the dissatisfied peasantry joined various underground secret societies in an effort to get protection and started to
rebel against the corrupt government. In 1851, the Taiping Rebellion
broke out and spread over a large portion of China before it was suppressed in 1864, the Nien Rebellion broke out in 1853 and lasted until
1868, and the Moslem Rebellion broke out in Yunnan and ran its
course from 1855 to 1873. Although these long-lasting rebellions did
not establish any rival governments to contest the court at Peking, the
need for change became apparent. 61
China was thus forced to recognize the Western superiority. A
group of Chinese ruling elite and intellectuals felt that the only way to
save China was to introduce and accept Western technology, especially military technology. Under the leaderships of Tseng Kuo-fan
and Li Hung-chang, a number of Westernization programs were installed. The list included the following important accomplishment:
1863 A foreign language school was established.
1865 The Kiangnan Arsenal was established.
1867 The Nanking Arsenal was established.
1870 A machine factory was enlarged at Tientsin.
1871 A foreign-style fort was planned for Taku.
1872 Students were sent to study in America. Officers
61. For detailed discussion on China's crisis during this period, please refer to Chiennung Li, The Political History of China, 1840-1928 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1967). Chung-li Chang, The Chinese Gentry (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1955). Ssu-ho Ch'i, Ya-pien Chan-cheng The Opium War, 6 vols. (Shanghai: People's
Press, 1957).
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were sent to study military science in Germany. The
China Merchants Steam Navigation Company was
organized.
1875 A plan was made to build steel warships.
1876 A request was made to open a bureau to study foreign
sciences in all provinces; also to add a new subject on
foreign affairs in the civil service examinations. Students and apprentices from the Foochow shipyard
were sent to Germany for advanced training.
1878 The Kaiping coal mine was opened.
1879 A telegraph line was opened from Taku to Tientsin.
1880 A plan for a modern navy was launched, beginning
with a program to purchase warships from foreign
countries. A naval school was established at Tientsin.
1881 A dockyard was built at Port Arthur. A cotton mill
was planned at Shanghai.
1885 A military preparatory school was established. The
navy yamen was inaugurated.
1887 Mints were established at Tientsin and Paoting.
1888 The Peiyang Army was organized.
1891 The Lung-chang paper mill was founded at Shanghai.
The above list of Westernization programs is heavily focused on improving Chinese military strength by buying Western warships, by setting a modern communication network, by studying Western military
strategy, by developing natural resources, and by learning foreign
languages.
At the same time, the traditional sector of Chinese intellectuals
was undergoing a stage of self examination and evaluation in a fanatical effort to slow down Western invasion of Chinese culture. The traditionalists claimed Western civilization as being materialistic and
lacking spiritual virtue, and thus inferior to Confucian teachings. Traditionalist Feng Kuei-fen said:
The intelligence and wisdom of the Chinese are necessarily
superior to those of the various barbarians, only formerly we
have not made use of them. . . . If we let Chinese ethics and
famous (Confucian) teachings serve as an original foundation and let them be supplemented by the methods used by
the various nations for the attainment of prosperity and
strength, would it not be the best of all procedures? 62
62. Cited in Fairbank and Teng, eds., China's Response to the West, supra note 26, pp.
52-54.
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By the end of the period, however, the traditionalists gradually lost
their appeal for the preservation and restoration of Confucian order as
China lost war after war to every foreign nation they had fought
against and faced an immediate total destruction. Mary C. Wright
refers this effort of the traditionalists as "the last stand of Chinese
Conservatism," 63 by which she suggested thereafter there was no effective formal defense of the Confucian ethic.
As one can see easily the only purpose of t~e Westernization programs at this stage was to save China from foreign domination. Military reform programs became the prime target for Westernization,
while social and political institutions still remained largely untouched.
The ultimate goal of the government sponsored Westernization programs was to achieve military equality with the West while at the
same time maintaining the traditional social and political systems as
intact as possible. Gasster points out, "all that they (the Chinese) did
... they considered means of defense. Each step had to be justified on
the grounds that it would help to keep the foreigners out; at the same
time, each experiment had to be guaranteed not to impinge upon the
essentials of Chinese life. " 64
In short, what the Chinese leaders really intended to achieve during the period in the first stage was on"Iy a limited partial change on
the improvement of military technology, not an extended change on
the part of social structure.
(II) Reform and Revolution-The second stage in the Chinese
modernization process begins with the campaign by K'ang Yu-wei for
an extensive reform program on the socio-political institution of China
immediately following the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War in
1895 and ends with the success of the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty
under the revolutionary leadership of Dr. Sun yat-sen in 1911.
The dream of building a strong new China through the reapproachment of a Confucian revival and a military Westernization was
completely destroyed in 1895 after China lost the war to Japan. Most
Chinese had never regarded Japan as a strong or superior nation in
any respect. The defeat thus was an unbelievable shock to everyone.
The feeling of shame and inferiority quickly spread through the whole
country, from the scholar-officials at the top of the hierarchy to the
common people at the bottom, and from the urban centers to every
corner of the countryside throughout China. The inefficiency and in63. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, supra note 31.
64. Michael Gaster, China's Struggle to Modernize (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knoft, 1972), p.
15.
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adequacy of a partial reform such as a military Westernization program launched during the first stage now became apparent and
manifest. People now demanded a radical change and a far-reaching
plan covering every aspect of the social, economic, educational, and
political systems. Two groups of activists emerged during the period.
The first was a group of lower and middle ranking officials under the
leadership of K'ang Yu-wei which advocated extensive social and
political reforms, while the second group was led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen
who saw total revolution as the only way to save China.
K'ang Yu-wei was a reformed Confucian scholar who believed
China's problems were rooted deeply in the Confucian Classics which
had been misinterpreted and malpracticed until now. K'ang argues
the idea of reform was not anti-Confucianism but an integrated part of
the true Confucian teaching. He says:
For China, on the great earth, has had a ceaseless succession
of sacred emperors and the country has been famous. Her
principles, institutions, and culture are the most elevated in
the world. . . . Among all countries on earth none is her
equal. Only because her customs are unenlightened and because of a dearth of men of ability, she is passively taking
aggression and insult. . . . The water in the ocean is bubbling
and boiling. In our ears and in our dreams the noise of artillery is roaring. All you gentlemen, how can you avoid the
grief of being ruined and (becoming) subject to the rule of a
different race? Are we trying to avoid slander? 0 you closeddoor scholars, are some of you to the point of speaking about
respecting the emperor and refecting the barbarians? 65
K'ang Yu-wei won the support of a small group of Chinese
scholar-officials and was introduced to Emperor Kuang-hsu. On June
16, 1898, K'ang was appointed Probationary Secretary in the Tsungli
Yamen to carry out his reform programs. K'ang's proposed reform
included the following:
a. Changing the topics for themes in the district, provincial, and
metropolitan examinations from the selections from the Four Books to
topics on current problems.
b. Establishing a bureau of agriculture, industry, and commerce
in Peking.
c. Abolishing the sinecure appointments in the imperial
65. Cited in Fairbank and Teng, eds., China's Response to the West, supra note 26, p.
153.
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supervisorate of instruction, office of transmission, court of imperial
entertainments, court of state ceremonial, and grand court of revision.
d. Including the test of knowledge and techniques of Western
artilleries in the recruitment and training of military personnels.
e. Requiring students in all levels of schools in China to engage
in both Chinese and Western studies.
Although K'ang was able to attract the support of the Emperor,
the reform lasted only one hundred days as the Emperor was put
under house arrest by the Empress Tz'u-hsi who was the real power
holder of the time, after an unsuccessful coup d'etat in against the
Empress. K'ang was able to escape out of Peking, but five of his top
supports were captured and later executed by the Empress. Many of
K'ang's followers went underground and joined the revolutionary
movement led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in working for the overthrow of the
Ch'ing dynasty and for building a new China.
Unlike K'ang Yu-wei, Dr. Sun Yat-sen was not a Confucian
scholar. He was educated in Hong Kong and Hawaii and trained in
Western medicine with a very limited knowledge on the Chinese Classics. In fact, in his early years Dr. Sun was not much of a revolutionary theorist but merely an activist. His program for China's
reconstruction developed more closely than his persistent plotting to
overthrow the Manchus. Nevertheless, the failure of K'ang's reform
movement gave Dr. Sun and his revolutionary party a great opportunity to expand its organization and to challenge the Manchu regime
militantly. Four major goals of Dr. Sun's revolution at that time were
(a) Drive out the Tartars, (2) Restore China, (3) Establish the Republic, and (4) Equalize land ownership.
Dr. Sun's revolutionary ideas gradually ripened among the educated class within and without China after K'ang's failure. He was
particularly popular among the advanced Chinese students abroad,
and his headquarters was located in Japan. From 1906 to 1911, eleven
serious attempts were made to overthrow the Manchu regime by military means:
1906 The attempt at P'ing-hsing and Liu-yang, Hunan.
1907 The attempt at Chaochow and Huang-kang,
Kwangtung.
1907 The attempt at Huichow in Kwangtung.
1907 The attempt at Anking, Anhwei.
1907 The attempt at Ch'in-chou and Lien-chou m
Kwangtung.
1907 The attempt at Chen-nan-kuan, Kwangsi.
1908 The attempt at Anking, Anhwei.
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1910 The attempt at Canton.
1910 The attempt to assassinate the regent, Tsai-feng.
1911 The attempt at Huang-hua-kang, Kwangtung.
Although these attempts all resulted in failure, they did plant
seeds for later uprisings and the further spread of revolutionary ideas
from the Southeastern Coast of China to the interior provinces. A
large scale uprising at Wuchang on October 10, 1911 finally turned
into a successful revolution for Dr. Sun's party which eventually overthrew the Manchu regime. A republican government was established
on January 1, 1912.
(Ill) Authority Crisis and Disorganization-The third major
developmental stage in China's modernization effort covers the entire
period of the so-called republican China, from 1912 to 1949, before the
takeover of the mainland by the Chinese Communists. The major
characteristic of this period was the Chinese search for authority. The
intellectuals were considering various ideologies for modernization,
the political elites were advocating diverse Western political systems,
and the new merchants on the East coast and in the urban centers
were advertising for a free capitalist economy in China. Conflicting
programs were proposed and put into practice, and the results were
chaos and disorganization. 66
This period also marked the beginning of the total withdrawal of
the traditionalists. No one wanted to return to the old traditional
ways without reservation. The question people asked now was what
kind of modern system China should adopt-republic or dictatorship,
capitalism or socialism, democracy or something else. Various groups
fought for their own beliefs and systems, and each had its own version
of what China's future ought to be.
Thus, the May Fourth Movement of 1919, the civil war between
the Nationalists and the Chinese Communists throughout the most
part of this period, and even the fighting among the warlords during
the 1920s, can all be seen as incidents of how various groups fight for
their own version of China's future. The conflicts we saw in this period were not really a case of the modernizing elite fighting against the
66. For detailed discussion on authority crisis and disorganization during this period,
please refer to Tsai, Patterns of Political Elite Mobility in Modern China, 1912-1949. supra
note 25, Wen-hui Tsai, Essays on the Study of Chinese Modernization (Taipei: Oriental
Cultural Service, 1976). 1-tsu, The History of Chinese Political Parties During the Late
Ching and Early Republic (Hong Kong: Chung-san Books, 1968). Joseph R. Levenson,
Liang Chi-ch 'ao and the Mind of Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1970). Chi-ming Hou, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China, 1840-1937
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).
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traditionalists, but rather a case of struggles for power between competing modernizing groups. It was, in short, a period of confusion, of
searching for authority, and of power consolidation.
Yet, during this period, we also saw a brief period of constructive
development moving toward making a better China. In a ten-year period between 1927 and 1937, China enjoyed a temporary unity under
one single leadership, Chiang Kai-shek. The improvements included
the following:
1) In transportation-The national railway system was extended from 8,000 kilometers to 13,000 kilometers, the highway from
1,000 kilometers to 115,700 kilometers, and three national and regional airlines began to offer commercial air service.
b) In finance and economy-The national banking system was
reorganized into an integrated network, inflation was partially under
control, and the volumes of export and import trade increased
significantly.
c) In agriculture and mining-A Farmer's Bank was established
to provide loans for needed rural developments, a natural resource
commission was put up to be in charge of industrial development and
mining enterprises, and a national industrial planning was first
proposed.
d) In education-The number of universities and colleges increased from 70 to 108, middle schools from 954 to 1956, teacher's
schools frorri 236 to 816, and vocational schools from 149 to 494.
Unfortunately, the effort was interrupted by the outbreak of the
Sino-Japanese War and World War II. The subsequent civil war between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists after the War
made the continuation of modernization programs impossible.
(IV) Communist vs. Capitalist Approaches-The Chinese Communists victory on the mainland and the Nationalists withdrawal to
the island of Taiwan in 1949 marked the beginning of a new era in
China's long struggle for modernization. It signified not only the formal separation of two political regimes, but also the differential adoption of a modernization path: the Communist approach on mainland
China and the Capitalist approach in Taiwan.
During this period, most of the conflicting elements which we
saw in earlier stages have largely been eliminated and each political
government has established a firm policy on modernization programming. The results are different.
In Taiwan, the Nationalist government under the leaderships of
Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, has taken a very active and effective role in planning the island's economic growth and
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has successfully built a progressive growing capitalist economy in Taiwan over the past 30 years. Between 1953 and 1977, the government
has carried out six successive four-year economic plans through which
Taiwan's economy has switched from agriculture to an export-oriented industry. The result is a rapidly growing economy characterized
by export expansion, higher national income, the increase of GNP,
and more employment opportunity. Statistically speaking, the foreign
trade volume reached to $23,714 million and 89.1 percent of exports
came from industrial products in 1978; average income per capita
reached $1,722 in 1979; and an annual economic growth rate of 10.5
percent in 1978.
Economist Herman Kahn has singled out Taiwan, along with
South Korea and Japan, as "heroes" of development for they have
lifted themselves from object poverty to middle income levels in less
than a decade. Kahn predicts that Taiwan is now within a decade or
so of becoming fully a mature industrial economy and that it should
soon become a full fledged member of the affluent groups of nations. 67
In a report prepared for the World Bank, Fei, Randis & Kuo also have
a similar high praise for Taiwan. They note that Taiwan's success is
rare among less developed countries due to its extremely rapid rates of
economic growth, better distribution of income, and lower rate of
unemployment. 68
The Chinese Communists seized power from the nationalists in
1949. The strategy for economic development was built upon much
trial and error practice and from Chairman Mao's experience in his
guerrilla days. Over the thirty year period in Communist China, the
economic policies that served as vehicles for the strategy occurred can
be summarized in seven distinct "waves":
1) Economic reconstruction and land reforms. . . . . . . 1949-1952
2) Industrialization, nationalization, and collectivation:
the first five year plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1953-1957
3) The Great Leap Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1958-1959
4) Readjustment and recovery; priority given to
agriculture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1960-1965
5) The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution . . . . . . 1966-1969
6) Balanced growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1970-1977
7) Four Modernizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1978
We call the economic policies and growth in Communist China as a
67. Herman Kahn, World Economic Development (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Publisher, 1979), pp. 329-330.
68. John C.H. Fei, Gustav Ranis and Shirley W.Y. Kuo, Growth with Equity: The
Taiwan Case (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1979).
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series of "waves" because of their inconsistency and great fluctuation
within and between "waves." During the first and second waves between 1949 and 1957, the Chinese economy experienced a period of
rehabilitation and rebuilding with the implementation of the first Fiveyear Plan. By the end of this period, agricultural and industrial outputs both had shown increases. But the third wave was a disaster as
Mao called for a "Great Leap Forward." Between 1960 and 1965, the
Chinese economy bounced back in this period, evidenced by orderly
advances in many spheres of the nation. But unfortunately, the optimism quickly faded away with the outbreak of the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution in 1966; and for the next ten years China was in
total chaos. The death of Mao in 1976 marked a new beginning; the
new leader Deng Xiao-ping's call for Four Modernizations has started
to show impacts in Chinese life in the 1980s
There have been considerable disagreements among scholars on
the economic situation in Communist China. Some feel that the Communists' achievement is indeed impressive. Al Imfelt says, "After examining so many elements of China's model of development in
isolation and in various combinations, one can only reassemble the
whole and ask, is it working? The answer, obviously, is yes." 69 Alexander Eckstein also has similar observation, he says, "China's economic performance must be considered as impressive. . . . There is
very little doubt that the Chinese economy has been growing quite
rapidly." 70
However, such a positive evaluation of the Communists' economy
has been challenged by quite a few scholars who insist the Communists are basically a backward country economically. They argued the
so-called economic achievement of the Communists is too small and
limited to allow any real appreciation. This is particularly true when
one compares the economic achievement of Taiwan with that of the
Communists. Futhermore, the social and cultural developments of
Taiwan can not be matched by the Communists. 71
Thus, this fourth stage of Chinese modernization is characterized
by two competing socio-economic approaches between the Communists and the Republic of China in Taiwan. The result has been different: The Nationalists in Taiwan are much more progressively
69. AI. Imfeld, China as a Model of Development (N.Y.: Maryknoll, 1976), p. 148.
70. Alexander Eckstein, China's Economic Revolution (N.Y.: Cambridge University
Press, 1977), p. 310.
71. E.g., Chu-yuan Cheng, China's Economic Development (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Publisher, 1983).
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advanced in socio-economic than the Communist government of the
People's Republic of China on the mainland.
V.

THE "TAIWAN MIRACLE"

In China's long struggle toward modernization over the past one
hundred and forty years, the achievement of Taiwan since 1949 stands
out as extraordinary. it has shown to the world that Chinese society
can be successfully industrialized and that Confucianism is not all inconducive to industrialization and economic growth. Many Third
World nations have tried at modernization since the end of World
War II, but only a handful of them have been able to succeed. Taiwan
is one of these selected few which have succeeded. In the eyes of those
that are still struggling, Taiwan has created a "miracle." In this section, we will give a detailed discussion of Taiwan's economic and social modernizations since 1949.
1.

Industrialization and Economic Growth

The Nationalist Government's effort in improving Taiwan's
socio-economic structure could be traced back to the land reform program of 1949, four years prior to the announcement of the First Fouryear Plan for economic development. The first step in the land reform program was to reduce farm rent and to increase the share of
tenant farmers in crop yields, providing enough incentive for hard
work. The second step, which was launched in 1951, was to sell public
land to tenant farmers, followed by a program of compulsory sale of
land by landlords in 1953. The general objectives of the land reform
program are twofold: the new cultivators were encouraged to work
harder because they would benefit from any increase in agricultural
output, while the landlords were encouraged to participate in the industrial development of Taiwan through ownership of four large-scale
industrial enterprises at the time.
The success of the land reform program laid the foundation for a
modem economy in Taiwan. In the first two Four-Year Plans from
1953 to 1960, continuation of agriculture programs was evident:
"land-to-the-tiller program" was earnestly carried out, irrigation systems were repaired and expanded, and breeds of animals and strains of
seeds were improved. In industry, labor intensive production was encouraged to allow local products to compete with imported consumer
goods on the one hand, while raw material supplies and domestic productive capacity were expanded to stabilize commodity price and to
improve the country's balance of payments position. The overall ob-
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jective of the economic plannings during this period was to develop
industry through agriculture.
The second stage of Taiwan's economic planning, goals of which
were outlined in the Third and Fourth Four-Year Plans, from 1960 to
the early 1970's, saw a rapid eexpansion in economic activity. Several
programs were launched during the period aiming at switching Taiwan's economy from an agricultural to an industrial base, which included specific plans to encourage investment, renovate the financial
institution and system, and increase the pace of modernization. One
very important policy was the decision to place emphasis on the development of labor-intensive industries to manufacture products for export. The result was a rapidly growing economy characterized by
export expansion, the increase of GNP and national income, and a full
employment in Taiwan by the end of the 1960's.
The fast growth of Taiwan's economy is not without problems,
however. By the early 1970s, it had become clear that although the
basis of the economy had gradually shifted from agriculture to industry, the industrial structure itself had undergone little transformation.
Major problems included the inability of the infrastructure to accommodate the economy's increasing demands, the necessity of importing
almost all basic materials and intermediate goods, the shortage of labor and rising wage rates, the growing number and efficiency of international competitors, and unbalanced foreign trades.
The need for a basic shift in economic planning was made obvious
by the oil crisis of 1973 and the resulting world-wide recession. Like
that of many other countries, the economy of Taiwan suffered tremendously because of steeply rising commodity prices and inflation.
In order to meet the twin cltallenges of an outdated economic
structure and spiralling inflation, the government instituted a series of
far-ranging projects designed to transform Taiwan into a modem industrialized economy by the mid-1980's. Long-range plans were developed to promote modem management techniques and to update
industrial production methods through the Ten major Development
Projects and the Accelerated Rural Development Program.
The Ten major Development Projects, at the cost of $6.7 billion,
were aimed at production of energy and efficient transportation network. Six of these projects were concerned with transportation: the
Sun Yat-sen national Freeway, railway electrification, the North Link
Railway, the Chiang Kai-shek International Airport at Taoyuan, and
the construction of harbors at Taichung and Suao. Three projects
were designed to develop heavy and chemical industries: an integrated
steel mill, Kaohsiung shipyard, and a petrochemical complex. The

FROM TRADITION TO MODERNITY

45

tenth was the building of nuclear power plants to develop new sources
of energy.
The Accelerated Rural Development Program was aimed at protecting farmers' earnings, modernizing agriculture, increasing farm incomes, and employing farm workers more productively. The program
included the following measures:
a. Abolition of the rice-fertilizer barter system.
b. Abolition of the education surtax on farmland.
c. Easing of agricultural credit terms.
d. Improvement of agricultural marketing.
e. Strengthening of the rural infrastructure.
f. Integrated use of improved cultivation techniques.
g. Establishment of specialized agricultural areas.
h. Strengthening of agricultural research and extension.
1.
Establishment of new industries in rural areas.
J. Increase in purchase price of rice paid to farmers.
With the completion of the Ten Major Development
Projects and the Accelerated Rural Development Program
in 1979, the government announced a new Twelve New Development Projects to continue the country's modernization.
Again, a heavy emphasis was placed upon transportation as
we saw five of the twelve projects all dealing with transportation improvement: around-the-island railroad, three new
cross-island highways, Kaohsiung-Pingtung regional traffic
improvement, the second and third phases of Taichung Harbor, and widening of the Pingtung-Kaohsiung highways.
The other seven projects included two for agriculture, two
for industrial plants, and three for socio-cultural
developments.
In summary, Taiwan has successfully carried out five
Four-Year Plans from 1953 to 1973. The Sixth Four-Year
Plan was cut short due to the oil crises and the worldwide
recession in 1973. The government instituted a new SixYear Plan in 1976 which was completed in 1981, and a new
Ten-Year Plan was launched in 1982 aiming at transforming
Taiwan's economy from labor-intensive industry to high
technology.
The results from these economic plannings are remarkably successful in Taiwan. The national economy has shifted
from agriculture-oriented to industrial-oriented within a
short period of thirty years. When the Nationalist government of the Republic of China moved to Taiwan in 1949,
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Taiwan was predominately an agricultural society with a
large proportion of its population residing in rural areas.
The economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s has changed its
economic
structure
and
population
distribution
dramatically.
In economic structural change, we saw a gradual shift
in production from agriculture to industry. As shown in Table 2, industrial product occupied only 13.01 percent of the
total net domestic product in 1951, it was increased to 42.72
percent in 1981. As a result, the agriculture population also
declined which was reflected in the significant growth of the
non-agricultural population from 4 7.13 percent in 1951 to
71.9 percent in 1981. The transformation of an industrialoriented economy and the expansion of the npn-agricultural
population have also made rates of economic growth very
impressive. They ranged from 5.5 percent to 13.5 percent
annually in Taiwan between 1956 and 1979. Even the current recession of the 1980s failed to drastically slowdown
Taiwan's economic growth as the gross national product and
per capita income continued to grow.
Most impressively, however, is Taiwan's achievement
on a more equitable distribution of income during the years
of rapid economic growth. Fei, et. al. noted that "Taiwan's
achievement in the years after 1953 are particularly notable:
extremely rapid rates of economic growth were accompanied
by improvements in the family distribution of income; unemployment, or underemployment, was virtually eliminated by
the end of the 1960s.'m In Table 3, we found that the income of the lowest fifth of the Taiwan households accounted
for 7. 71 percent of the nation's total income in 1964, it increased to 8.89 percent in 1978 on the one hand, and that
income of the highest fifth had accounted for 41.07 percent
in 1964, but declined to 37.17 percent in 1978. It is apparent
that the gap between the poorest fifth and the highest fifth
has been narrowed, a more equitable income distribution
pattern.
72. Fei, Ranis, and Kuo, Growth with Equity: The Taiwan Case, supra note 68, p. 214.

TABLE 2:
Indicator

Selected Indicators of Taiwan's Economic Growth
1976

1979

1981

1951

1956

1961

1966

1971

% of non-agricultural population
in total population

47.13

49.96

50.96

55.31

60.26

66.30

67.74

71.9

% of industrial product in net
domestic product

13.01

14.53

16.99

20.34

28.90

32.55

34.32

42.72

Gross national product
(Million US$)

2110.5

3230.2

4525.5

7255.0

11979.6

18318.4

24751.6

20576.7

Per capita income (US$)

246

316

371

520

770

1039

1288

2570

Economic growth rate(%)

NA

5.50

6.83

9.01

12.90

13.48

8.08

5.04

(Sources: National Income of the Republic of China, 1979. Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1979. Graphical Survey of the Economy of
Taiwan, the Republic of China, 1980. Social Indicators of the Republic of China, /983).
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Table 3.

Distribution of Household Income by Division of Equal
Number of Households, 1964-1978

Year
1
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978

%
7.71
7.09
7.84
8.44
8.60
8.84
8.91
8.89

Five Population Groups•
3
4
2
%
12.57
12.45
12.22
13.27
13.25
13.49
13.64
13.71

%
16.62
16.19
16.25
17.09
17.06
16.99
17.48
17.53

%
22.03
22.01
22.32
22.51
22.48
22.05
22.71
22.07

5

Ratio**

%
41.07
41.45
41.37
38.69
38.61
38.63
37.26
37.17

5.33
5.25
5.28
4.58
4.49
4.37
4.18
4.18

Notes: *the five population groups are referred to their respective income. 1 represents the
lowest 20% of the population, while 5 represents the highest 20% of the
population in terms of the income.
**Ratio refers to folds of the 5th group to 1st group.
(Source: Executive Yuan, 1979. Table 16, p.45).

2. Social and Political Modernization
Industrialization involves the extended use of an inanimate source
of power in the production of economic goods and service. Economic
growth in general refers to the increase in the economy's real gross
national product or real national income. Judging from the data we
presented in the above section, Taiwan has successfully been industrialized and and has enjoyed impressive economic growth. In this section, we shall turn our attention to non-economic aspects of Taiwan's
modernization. We shall give a detailed assessment of such sociopolitical changes as urbanization, the emergence of the middle class,
educational attainment, health care, political participation and system
of social welfare that reflect Taiwan's social and political modernization since 1949.

A.

Rapid Urbanization

Demographers and urban sociologists agree that selective migration in some form should be regarded as a necessary phenomenon of
all modem, highly specialized societies. Donald Bogue believes, for
instance, persons with unique qualifications, training, or work histories need to be located where their activities can be used. He says, "A
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certain amoung of reshuffling of the population is required to locate
the various specialized categories of population where they are of most
value and where they can best participate in the social and economic
system.'m Migration is an integral element of social change process.
This is particularly true in developing nations, for the newly expanded
economy requires the movement of selected types of persons. New
technology and industry are likely to be located in and/or closer to
urban centers. It is thus not surprising that internal migration in developing nations tends to move from rural to urban.
In Taiwan, we saw the rapid increase of urban population: in
1952, only 47.6 percent of the population lived in urban places with a
population of 50,000 or more; in 1980, the urban population had
reached to 70.3 percent of the island's total population. In other
words, nearly three quarters of Taiwan's population are now living in
urban places. Between 1952 and 1976, the averge annual growth rate
of Taiwan's population was 3.0 percent, while the rate for growth in
urban places was 4.6 percent. Moreover, Taiwan has also witnessed
the emergence of two large metropolitan areas with a population of
one million or more. Taipei has a population of 2.3 million and Kaohsiung had 1.2 million in 1983.
Wen Lang Li found there seemed to be a high degree of correlation between the degree of industrailization and urbanization in Taiwan. He discovered that the higher the degree of industrialization a
locality has, the higher the net migration rate of that locality. 74 In
1957, Taipei was the only city with a population of 500,000 or more,
there were four such cities in 1978, and the population of these four
metropolisses accounted for 25.4 percent of the total population or
52.6 percent of the island's urban population. Such a crowded urban
population in these four metropolises in recent years has forced their
residents to start to move to suburbs, a process of suburbanization.
Taking the Taipei metropolitan area as an example, Kang-cheng Chen
discovered that the distance between the average household and the
central city of Taipei has increased significantly during the period between 1962 and 1979, particularly the years after 1970. 75 Chen's dis73. Donald Bogue, "Internal Migration," in Philip Hauser and O.D. Duncan, eds., The
Study of Population (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 497.
74. Wen Lang Li, "Urbanization and Demographic Migration in Taiwan," in Wen
Kuo and Y.M. Tsai, eds., Studies on Urban Development (Taipei: Chi-liu Books, 1978), pp.
123-146.
75. Kang-cheng Chen, "Urbanization and Urban Problems in Taiwan," in Wen-hui
Tsai and Michael Hsiao, eds., Comparative Social Problems in U.S. and Taiwan (Taipei:
Tong-ta Books, 1985), pp. 121-142.
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covery is presented in Figure I.
The concentration of population in urban places have pushed the
government to implement policies aiming at improving urban living.
Figure I

Distance Between the Average Household and the
Central City of Taipei, 1962-1979
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(Source: K.C. Chen, 1985, Figure 3, p. 133)

From 1956 to 1979, for example, the government has invested a total
of US$167. 7 million in public housing project in urban cities. Statistics also show that the public housing authority has built 75,951 units
of apartment-type dwelling. In addition, plans are now underway to
develop three satellite "urban towns" nearby the three industrial centers of Taipei, Kao-hsiung, and Tai-chung. The new Ten-year Economic Development Plan (1980-1989) also calls, in addition to
economic planning, extensive and far-reaching improvement on the
general welfare and livelihood of the people of Taiwan. The Plan asks
for accelerating urban planning and development, construction of urban housing, improving the quality of life in urban areas, and intensifying environmental protection measures against pollution and
ecological abuses in and around cities. With nearly three quarters of
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Taiwan's population now living in urban places, urban planning will
undoubtedly receive more and more attention from the government.

B.

The Emergence of the Middle Class

Alongside with the process of industrialization and economic development, the occupational structure in Taiwan has shown a dramatical change, reflected in the decline of agricultural-related population
and the increase of industrial and professional population. An examination of Taiwan's labor force distribution in 1965 showed 43.9 percent in agricultural-related activities, 21.7 percent in industrial and
manufacturing professions, and 34.5 percent in service professions. In
1981, however, agricultural-related activities had declined to 18.8 percent, while industrial and manufacturing professions and service professions increased to 43.7 percent and 37.5 percent respectively. The
shift clearly demonstrates that Taiwan has moved from an agricultural
society to an industrial and service society.
One of the most significant features of a society undergoing rapid
industrialization and economic growth is the emergence of an influential middle class consisting of mainly professionals and white collar
workers. Chia-yu Hsu in a discussion on social stratification suggested
that the middle class in Taiwan should include three groups of professions: government personnels and the staffs of educational institutions, professionals and technical workers, and administrative and
managerial workers. In 1983, these three groups occupied 28.4 percent of the total employed labor force in Taiwan. Hsu observed that
members of this middle class are "quick in their thinking, better educated, secured financial sources, and a strong sense of national identity."76 Most of the social scientists in Taiwan today agree that this
middle class is most responsible for the success of Taiwan's economic
development we see today. 77
Industrialization, economic growth, and the expansion of the occupational sphere in Taiwan have all contributed to the emergence of
an influential middle class. As a consequence, upward social mobility
in Taiwan is attainable and frequent. A study found a great majority
of the members of the middle class in Taiwan had a lower class origin.
The study also found education is the main source for upward social
mobility. 78
76. Chia-yu Hsu, "Social Stratification in Taiwan," China Tribune No. 240, p. 44.
77. E.g., Tsai and Hsiao, eds., Comparative Social Problems in U.S. and Taiwan, supra
note 75. Yang, Kuo-hsu and Chi-cheng Yeh, eds., Social Problems in Taiwan Today
(Taipei: Chi-liu Books, 1984).
78. Hsian-yun Wang, Social Mobility in Taiwan (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1982).
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Education

Students of modernization and developmental sociology have
long recognized the significance of education as an indispensable variable in modernization of non-western societies. They have all pointed
out education is both a cause and an effect of modernization in these
societies. 79 As a cause, education is indispensable because there are so
many complex tasks within an urban industrial setting that require an
ability to read and write; and as an effect, education is seen as a source
of national pride and an index of societal development. It is generally
true that the more education a society's population, the higher its
socio-economic development.
In assessing the educational attainment of Taiwan, two sets of
measurements are analyzed: rates of illiteracy and growth of school
enrollment. Examination of the available data pertaining to these two
kinds of measures reveals relative significance of education in Taiwan.
In 1962, the rate of illiteracy was 24.8 percent in the population aged 6
years old and over; but in 1982 the rate was decreased to only 9.6
percent. It is also interesting to note that half of those who have educations received at least the secondary education in 1983. As Table 4
shows among those who are educated in 1962, 2.0 percent received
college education, 13.7 percent secondary education, 55.3 percent primary education, 4.2 percent self-taught and 24.8 were illiterate; in
1982, the distribution shows 8.0 percent with higher education, 39.2
percent secondary education, 60.9 percent primary education, 2.4 percent self-taught, and 9.6 percent illiterate.
Another change can be seen in the increase of student enroilments in Taiwan during the past twenty years. In 1962, as shown in
Table 5, the rates of enrollment in their respective age groups were
84.4 percent for compulsary education, 96.5 percent for primary education, 35.0 percent for secondary education, and 3.9 percent for
higher education. But in 1982 the rates had been improved to 99.7
percent for compulsory education, 99.8 percent for primary education,
85.6 percent for secondary education, and 11.4 percent for higher education. The number of schools also shows a significant increase, from
3.095 in 1961 to 5,738 in 1983. During the same period, the number
79. E.g., H. Alavi and T. Sham in, eds., Introduction to the Sociology of "Developing
Societies" (N.Y.: Monthly Press, 1982). Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, Becoming Modern (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974). Wilbert E. Moore, World Modernization (N.Y.: Elserier, 1979). C. Morse, ed., Modernization by Design (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1968).
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Year

Po2ulation Aged 6 and Over
In Taiwan, 1962-1982.
Higher
Education
%

Secondary
Education
%

1962
2.0
2.3
1964
2.5
1966
3.2
1968
3.7
1970
4.4
1972
4.8
1974
1976
5.6
6.5
1978
7.5
1980
8.0
1982
(Source: The Executive Yuan,

13.7
15.3
15.8
15.3
18.0
20.2
29.1
31.9
34.4
36.5
39.2
1983. Table

b~
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Educational Attainment

Primary
Education
%

SelfTaught
%

Illiterate

55.3
56.0
54.8
30.8
31.6
31.4
49.9
47.6
45.2
43.2
40.9

4.2
4.0
3.8
3.5
3.4
3.3
2.9
2.8
2.7
2.5
2.4

24.8
22.5
23.1
16.4
14.7
13.3
13.3
12.1
11.2
10.3
9.6

%

34, p.75.)

of full time teachers in all levels of schools also was increased from
71,098 persons to 179,864 persons.
In summary, education in Taiwan during the past twenty years
has shown improvement in both quantity and quality. This better educated population has played a significant role in pushing Taiwan toward industrialization and modernization.
D.

Healtf1 Care

Researchers generally agree that industrialization and the subsequent economic and social development bring improvements in the
general health of a population, and that the more a society is industrialized, the more developed its medical and health-care system become. 80 In Taiwan, economic growth, an increase in national wealth,
better income distribution, and other social developments have been
accompanied by improving health care. This section will give a statistical presentation of the improvements in health and medical-care fa80. Vincente Navarro, "Radicalism, Marxism and Medicine," International Journal of
Health Service, vol. 13, pp. 179-202. World Bank, Health (N.Y.: World Bank, 1980).
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Table 5.

Enrollment Rate in Taiwan, 1962-1982

Year

Compulsory
Education
%

Primary
Education
%

Secondary
Education
%

Higher
Education
%

1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982

84.4
83.5
84.4
87.9
91.4
93.8
94.8
97.5
99.1
99.5
99.7

96.5
96.8
97.2
97.7
98.0
98.1
98.5
99.4
99.6
99.7
99.8

35.0
36.3
38.4
45.0
54.1
61.5
63.3
74.1
76.3
80.3
85.6

3.9
5.5
5.3
5.4
8.3
9.0
9.5
9.4
10.2
10.5
11.4

Note:

the enrollment rates here are the percentage of the enrolled students in their
respective age groups. For compulsory education, the comparative age group is
aged 6-14; for primary education, aged 6-11; for secondary education, aged 12-17;
and for higher education, aged 18-24.

(Source: The Executive Yuan, 1983. Table 31, pp. 70-71.)

cilities, medical and para-medical personnel structure, and general
health conditions of the Taiwanese population.
The number of public and private hospitals and clinics has steadily increased in Taiwan. The data for the period between 1961 and
1980 on public hospitals and clinics operated by central and local governments reflect a slow but steady increase. As shown in Table 6, the
1,089 public hospitals and clinics in 1961 were increased to 1,295 in
1980. Although the data for private hospitals and clinics before 1970
were unavailable, Table 6 does show a rapid increase in the 1970s,
from 6,338 units in 1971 to 9.993 in 1980. A comparison between
public and private hospitals and clinics during the 1970s indicates a
faster growth in the private sector. Taking 1971 as the base year for
comparison, the index for public hospitals and clinics in 1980 was 108,
while the index for private hospitals and clinics in 1980 was 157.7. A
similar growth trend can also be seen in the increase of hospital beds.
The number of hospital beds per 10,000 population has increased from
3. 70 in 1961 to 22.41 in 1980. The expansion of hospital beds is attrib-
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utable to the growth in the private sector of health and medical facilities, as discussed earlier.
Table 6
Year

Health and Medical Facilities
Public
Index
Number

Private
Index
Number

1961
1,089
90.8
1962
1,090
90.9
1963
1,091
91.0
1964
1,093
91.2
91.2
1965
1,093
1966
1,105
92.2
1,093
91.2
1967
1968
1,091
91.0
1969
1,094
91.2
1970
1,100
91.7
1971
1,199
100.0
6,338
100.0
1972
1,201
100.2
6,378
100.6
1973
1,201
100.2
6,758
106.6
1,201
100.2
7,492
110.2
1974
1,204
100.4
8,470
133.6
1975
1,216
101.4
135.1
1976
8,563
1,208
100.8
139.5
8,840
1977
1,213
101.2
144.2
1978
9,140
151.8
1,230
102.6
9,618
1979
157.7
1,295
108.0
9,993
1980
Source: Executive Yuan, Social Indicators of the Republic of China, 1982. Taipei: The
Executive Yuan, Table 37, pp. 82-83.
The total number of medical and para-medical personnel during
the past 20 years has also shown increase, from 12,678 in 1961 to
42,417 in 1980, a net increase of 29,739, which include increases of
6,764 physicians, 1,105 dentists, 10,071 nurses, 5,824 pharmacists, and
5,375 other medical-related specialists. A detailed analysis of medical
and paramedical personnel growth reveals the increase occurred
largely among specialists other than physicians and dentists. As
shown in Table 7, although physicians constituted more than half of
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the medical professionals in the early 1960s, they have steadily declined as a percentage of the medical pool ever since. In 1980, physicians accounted for only 31.4 percent of the total medical and
paramedical personnel, which reflected a decline of 20.5 percent during the past 20 years. The percentage of dentists experienced a similar
decline, from 6.3 percent in 1961 to 4.5 percent in 1980. Nurses and
pharmacists, however, have both enjoyed a significant increase. In
1961, nurses constituted 12.5 percent and pharmacists 7.5 percent of
the total medical and para-medical professionals, but the percentages
in 1980 showed 27.5 percent for nurses and 16.0 percent for pharmacists. The expansion within the medical and paramedical professions
in Taiwan has thus been largely in the two specialities of trained
nurses and pharmacists.
The steady expansions of both health and medical-care facilities
and staffs have provided better health care for the general population
of Taiwan. The number of physicians per 10,000 population increased
from 6.0 in 1961 to 7.5 in 1980, dentists from 0.7 to 1.2, pharmacists
from 0.9 to 6.8, and nurses from 1.5 to 6.6. At the same time, the
number of hospital beds per 10,000 population also increased, from
2.70 in 1961 to 22.4 in 1980. Statistics also show that in 1961 government health-related expenditures total US$1,076,877, a figure increased to US$196,778,000 in 1982. 81
As a result of the expansion of medical and health-care services,
the health conditions of the general population in Taiwan have been
improved over the years. One indicator of such an improvement is the
decline of mortality rates. During the period between 1962 and 1982,
as shown in Table 8, the crude death rates declined from 6.3 per 1,000
population to 4.8 per 1,000 population; the mortality rates for newborn children declined from 31.4 to 8.1; and the maternal mortality
rates from 8.8 to 1.9 per 1,000. Meanwhile, the average life expectancy has been extended from 62.3 years for men and 57.8 for women
to 70.2 years for men and 75.1 years for women during the same
period.
81. National Health Administration, Health Statistics of the Republic of China (Taipei:
·
Executive Yuan, 1983), p. 30.

Table 7.
Year

Total

Physicians

%

Medical and Para-Medical Personnel Structure
Dentists

%

Nurses

%

Pharmacists

%

Others

%

1961

12,678

6,574

51.9

804

6.3

1,588

12.5

951

7.5

2,761

21.8

1962

12,686

6,591

52.0

814

6.4

1,595

12.6

1,003

7.9

2,683

21.1

1963

13,002

6,543

50.3

808

6.2

1,798

13.8

1,043

8.0

2,810

21.7
21.6

1964

13,282

6,649

50.0

816

6.1

1,852

13.9

1,110

8.4

2,855

1965

13,017

6,656

51.1

794

6.1

1,611

12.4

1,207

9.3

2,749

21.1

1966

14,167

7.052

49.8

791

5.6

2,055

14.5

1,364

9.4

2,905

20.7

1967

15,820

7,753

49.0

800

5.1

2,440

15.4

1,515

9.6

3,312

20.9

1968

17,012

7,551

38.8

815

4.8

2,682

15.8

1,586

9.3

4,378

25.7

1969

17,307

7,166

35.5

760

4.4

3,287

19.0

1,661

9.6

4,433

25.5

1970

18,992

7,552

39.6

819

4.3

3,646

19.2

2,289

12.1

4,716

24.8

19.8

2,908

16.0

2,952

16.2

3,365

17.6

2,989

15.7

1971

18,227

7,841

43.0

910

5.0

3,616

1972

19,094

7,968

41.7

933

4.9

3,839

20.1

1973

20,447

8,367

40.9

997

4.9

4,138

20.2

3,621

17.7

3,324

16.3

1974

22,457

9,316

41.5

1,050

4.7

4,243

18.9

4,141

18.4

3,707

16.5

1975

26,597

10,723

40.3

1,219

4.6

4,919

18.5

5,038

18.9

4,698

17.7

1976

32,008

11,361

35.5

1,366

4.3

8,560

26.7

5,466

17.1

5,255

16.4

1977

34,743

12,097

34.8

1,539

4.4

9,182

26.4

5,878

16.9

6,047

17.5

1978

36,191

12,485

34.5

1,581

4.4

9,749

26.9

6,238

17.2

6,138

17.0

1979

39,614

13,169

33.7

1,773

4.5

11,256

28.4

6,761

17.1

6,655

16.8

27.5

6,775

16.0

8,736

20.6

1980
Sources:

42,417

13,338

31.4

1,909

4.5

11,659

Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China. 1981. Taipei: Executive Yuan, Table 222, pp. 632-633. Social Indicators of the Republic of
China, 1982. Taipei: Executive Yuan. Table 37, pp. 82-83.
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Table 8.

Year

Death and Life

Crude.
Death
Rate
{0/00}

Ex~ectanc~

Death
Infant
Mortality
Rate
{0/00}

1962
6.3
5.3
1964
1966
5.4
5.4
1968
1970
4.9
1972
4.7
1974
4.8
1976
4.7
1978
4.7
1980
4.8
1982
4.8
(Source: National Health

in Taiwan, 1962-1982
Life Expectancy

Maternal
Mortality
Rate
{0/0000}

31.4
25.9
21.7
20.7
16.9
14.0
12.9
10.6
9.9
9.8
8.1
Administration,

(Years)
62.6
63.8
64.1
63.6
66.1
67.6
67.8
68.7
69.2
69.6
70.2

87.9
79.4
71.6
54.0
40.4
34.7
32.4
29.5
29.6
18.7
19.1
1983.

F

M

Table

67.9
69.2
69.7
69.7
71.2
72.3
72.7
73.6
74.3
74.5
75.1

14,15,16, pp.58-65)

In summary, increases in national wealth and personal income
have contributed to an expansion of medical and health-care service
which, in tum, has provided better health and a longer life expectancy
for the population in Taiwan.

E.

Political Participation

It is generally believed that economic growth in most of developing societies can not succeed without an effective political administration to coordinate its developmental programming. 82 Taiwan has
enjoyed a remarkable degree of political stability during the past thirty
years that have been conducive to attracting foreign investments, policy consistency and predictability, and domestic capital formation.
Moreover, political stability brings confidence to people in the society
and encourages the emergence of nationalism through which the improvement of the way of life, both socially and culturally, becomes
82. E.g., I.L. Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development (N.Y.: Oxford University Press,
1966). Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1968).
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part of a nation's pride. Political stability has been achieved through
an extended political participation from the masses.
One indicator of such an extended political participation is the
higher rate of voting in each election in Taiwan. Table 9 clearly demonstrates a consistent higher rate of voting participation, ranging from
seventy-three percent to eighty percent in county and city council elections and from sixty-nine percent to eighty percent in mayoral
elections.
Table 9.
Term
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Voter ParticiQation in Taiwan, 1950-1982
Provincial
Assembly*
%

City-County
Council**
%

NA
74.4
78.2
72.5
69.3
74.3
70.3
80.4
71.9

80.7
79.7
78.9
78.3
73.8
76.8
78.0
73.3
80.5
75.4

Magistrates
& Mayors***
%

79.6
74.9
78.2
72.5
69.1
74.3
70.3
80.4
71.9

Notes:
*The first election for provincial assembly was held in 1951.
The election has been held in every five years since 1962.
**The first election for city and county council was held in 1950.
There have been 10 elections since then.
***The first election for magistrates and majors was held in 1950 and the last one held in
1981.
(Source: The Executive Yuan, Social Indicators of the Republic of China, 1982. Table 68,
pp. 156-157)

Moreover, the Nationalist government in Taiwan has also held
several special elections to increase the membership share of the
Taiwanese in the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and Control
Yuan. Since the first special election of 1969, the National Assembly
has added 76 new members to its total delegates, the legislative Yuan
has added 98 new members, and the Control Yuan has added 32.
Although the great majority of the membership in these three legisla-
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tive branches of the Nationalist government still are the "old guards,"
those who were elected to their seats prior to the Chinese Communists
victory on the Mainland in 1949, the special elections have opened a
new door for larger participation from the residents of Taiwan. More
importantly, a recent study has found this newly elected group of legislators has played an extraordinary role in Taiwan's political
process. 83
F.

Social Welfare

As society becomes more affiuent with the cumulation of national
wealth, the Nationalist government in Taiwan is able to pay more attention to social welfare for the less privileged population. One indicator of such a concern is the increase of the government's spending on
social welfare throughout the years. Table 10 shows social welfare
spending by the government in 1962 was NT$1,116.9 million and was
increased to NT$52,143 million in 1981. The increase of social welfare spending is consistent with the growth in Taiwan's Gross National Product volumes. In 1962, social welfare spending was
approximately 1.5 percent of GNP and 7.2 percent of the total government expenditures; it was increased to 3.9 percent and 11.8 percent
respectively in 1981.
83. "An Evaluation on the Performance of Members of the Legislation Yuan," United
Monthly, No. 7, pp. 8-23.
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Table 10.

Gross National Product, Government Expenditures, &
Social Welfare Spending in Taiwan

Year

GNP
(million NT$)*

Government
Expenditures
(million NT$)*

Social Welfare
Spending
(million NT$)*

1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

76,652
86,710
101,492
111,895
125,343
144,839
168,695
195,693
225,283
262,125
314,369
407,419
544,847
581,150
696,101
811,819
967,938
1,164,473
1,440,778
1,703,713

15,414.0
16,456.8
18,485.5
22,391.3
23,836.0
30,726.8
33,002.0
41,868.9
49,152.6
54,829.1
63,667.7
79,835.9
89,982.0
126,435.5
149,821.6
191,472.7
227,341.2
265,749.3
344,598.5
433,415.8

1,116.9
1,259.6
1,495.4
1,699.1
1,123.8
2,197.8
2,581.3
3,724.5
4,712.0
5,682.9
8,101.8
8,663.7
9,719.9
12,657.4
16,940.3
20,428.1
24,489.1
29,706.7
38,223.8
51,143.0

Notes:

I
(%)**

II
(%)***

1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
0.9
1.5
1.5
1.9
2.0
2.2
2.6
2.1
1.8
2.2
2.4
2.5
2.5
2.6
2.7
3.0

7.2
7.6
8.1
7.6
4.7
7.1
7.8
8.9
9.6
10.4
12.7
10.9
10.8
10.0
11.3
10.7
10.8
11.2
11.1
11.8

At current prices.
**I = social welfare spending/GNP X 100.
•••n = social welfare spending/government expenditures X 100.

(Sources: Data on GNP and government expenditures are taken from National Income of
the Republic of China, 1981. Data on social welfare spending are calculated from the
Yearbook of the Ministry of Finance, 1981.)

Two major social insurances programs have been implemented in
Taiwan: the Government Employees' Insurance and the Labor Insurance Scheme. Both insurance programs include coverages for retirement and medical expenses. In addition, the government also provides
free medical treatment and care for the needy, poor, and the disabled.
At the same time, the Nationalist government has also gone
through the legislative process of establishing goals and procedures for
the management of social welfare programs. Between 1970 and 1981,
four major pieces of welfare legislations were passed: they are the
Welfare Law for Children in 1973, the Welfare Law for the Aged in
1980, the Welfare for the Disabled in 1980, and the Social Assistance

62

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

Law in 1980. 84 A basic labor wage act was just passed last year to
protect minimum wage for workers.
Awareness of social welfare has also increased in recent years
among the public, especially the intellectuals. An examination of popular and professional magazines and journals in Taiwan between 1969
and 1981 shows that the number of articles and essays on topics related to social welfare published was increased from 29 io 161 during
the period. In summary, Taiwan has successfully made progress in
both economical and social modernizations. It is a classic example of
macro-development by design, characterized by a mixture of state
planning and private free capitalist economy. The state established an
overall guideline and objective, while the private capitalist sectors put
them into practice. The cooperation between private industrialists and
the state has shifted Taiwan from a underdeveloped nation to a developed nation in a span of only thirty years. The success of Taiwan then
provides an excellent model for the People's Republic of China on the
Mainland in its current campaign on the Four Modernizations.

VI.

HISTORICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S
MODERNIZATION

The modernization process of China during the past 140 years
has distinguished itself in several important ways that differ from both
its own traditional reform movements in the earlier dynasties and
modernization of Japan and other developing nations. The frustration
and agony of China's inability to modernize itself to join the rank of
the advanced and modernized in early years has been replaced by a
sense of self-respect and dignity. As Taiwan has successfully created a
"miracle," the goal of the Chinese final modernization is thus unmistakenly attainable. Let us identify the unique characteristics of
China's past process of modernization.
(1) It is a process of Westernization. As has been mentioned,
modernization is the process of change toward those types of social,
economic, and political system that have developed in Western Europe
and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth
and have then spread to other European countries to the South American, Asian, and African countries. In the non-Western societies,
therefore, it is a process of what Kautsky has called "coming from
84. Wen-hui Tsai and Ly-yun Chang, "Policy, Ideology, and Social Welfare Programs:
A Critical Evaluation of Social Welfare Legislation in Taiwan," Journal of Sociology, No.
17, 1985, pp. 233-262.
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without." 85
It is precisely this process of change toward those Western types
of social, economic, and political systems that China has been deeply
embraced in the past 140 years. The new systems are essentially foreign to China and thus lack support from the traditional sector of the
society.
Although scholars have argued that modernization and Westernization are not the same process, to people of the developing societies
the two terms are synonyms. This is particularly true in the case of
China. The initial call for modernization in nineteenth century China
was in response to Western dominance. The Chinese had always seen
themselves as the center of the world before the arrival of Western
civilization. Pye says, "the Chinese understandably developed a deep
sense of cultural superiority. Others might be rude and militarily vicious, but the Chinese had no reason to doubt, in spite of some unfortunate experiences, that they were culturally the center of the world,
the Middle Kingdom, as they called themselves. Although during the
last thousand years of the imperial order all or part of China was ruled
by alien conquerors, the Chinese persisted in feeling supremely selfassured."86
The Chinese strongly believed that their history has shown Chinese civilization is so superior that it can absorb any foreign element in
the process of "sinification," becoming Chinese. Thus, even when
China failed to contain Westerners and lost almost every war at the
hands of the Westerners in the second half of the nineteenth century,
the Chinese still were reluctant to accept the fact that the West was
superior. The self-awareness movement, as has been mentioned, was
aimed at preserving and restoring Chinese culture while supplementing it with Western "materials." But when China lost its war to Japan, a country that had been China's inferior younger brother for
several centuries, it was the most demoralizing blow to the Chinese
superiority complex. The only reason the Japanese defeated China,
the Chinese leaders believed, was Japan's total Westernization. After
this defeat, the question was no longer whether China should adopt
Western culture or not, but how to Westernize. The necessity for an
extensive Westernization involving military as well as socio-cultural
change gradually became apparent. From 1895 to 1910 they founded
schools in which Western languages, mathematics, and science were
85. John H. Kautsky, The Political Consequences of Modernization (N.Y.: John Wiley,
1972).
86. Lucian W. Pye, China: An Introduction (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), p. 101.
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taught; they studied international law, established a Western-style foreign office, and began to engage in Western-style diplomacy; they built
arsenals and shipyards in which they could manufacture modern
weapons and introduced new concepts into military training; they sent
students abroad; and they began to think about adopting western
methods of transportation and communication. After the 1911 republican revolution, they even established an American-style republicandemocratic government. In the period under the Nationalist rule,
from 1912 to 1949, western-trained intellectuals consisted of the majority of Chinese new leadership. In mainland China, the isolation
from the advanced Western nations since 1949 has been blamed for its
subsequent backward underdevelopment. "To catch up to the West"
has been the ultimate goal in the Chinese effort toward modernization
from the very beginning.
(2). It is an extensive and far-reaching process of change. The
second major characteristic of the Chinese modernization process lies
in its extensive scope of involvement and far-reaching consequence of
impact. Although stability and integration had been two of the most
distinguished traits of traditional Chinese social structure, China did
experience ups and downs from time to time throughout its long history. Not only were there political revolutions overthrowing the old
dynasty in favor of establishing a new dynasty, but also several largescale reform movements were organized in various dynasties aiming at
changing parts of the existing social-economic institutions. But not
any of these movements and revolutions in the earlier history of China
can match the extensiveness in scope and result to that of the modernization attempt during the past 140 years.
Political revolutions, social reforms, and other types of change in
traditional China were aimed at a partial change within the existing
social structure, and their main purposes were not for a total destruction of the systems involved, but for what Eisenstadt has called "accommodable change."
Eisenstadt argued that processes of accommodable change were
connected with the social condition that made possible the continuous
fundamental harmony in traditional Chinese society. Conflicts among
different political groups were often regulated through the existing
norms and activities of the major political and regulative institutions
of the society.
Modernization, on the contrary, is for a total change. It affected
every aspect of the Chinese social structure; the traditional political
system, Confucian ideology, moral value, religious belief, educational
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system, and economic activity were all under attacks from the new
systems of ideals coming along with modernization. Whether one
likes it or not, China will change in the direction of greater modernization or more precisely Westernization.
Chinese intellectuals and political leaders were convinced that a
complete overhaul of the existing social structure was necessary and
that the inevitable solution was Westernization.
They indicated that the age of resistance to Western civilization
had been passed; the Chinese now should go straight ahead to a wholesale Westernization and a wholehearted modernization.
As the call for modernization became the supreme goal of the
Chinese leadership, family institution was gradually changed. The
political system was shifted from traditional monarchy to, first, republican-democracy, then to Communism. Confucianism and folk belief
are now being labelled as backward and superstitious and foreign education became the highest symbol of achievement. Various competing
systems of Western culture dominated the new China in the period
between 1912-1949. In short, almost every aspect of Chinese life has
been under the influence of Western culture as a result of the attempt
to modernize during the past 140 years.
(3). It is a revolution from the top. Although students of modernization in Western societies have generally stressed the necessity of
the development of a modern attitude in the general population as a
prerequisite for the modernization of a society, many researchers on
the modernization in non-Western societies have found that perhaps
the most important factor in these societies is the political leadership,
and that the political style of the leaders in a society not only affects
the type and function of political structure but also the tempo and
destination of the society's economic and social transformation.
Morse said:
If modernization is a super problem-as it is-it can be resolved only if the group in power recognizes the problem and
correctly apprehends its nature, if it then creates the kinds of
organizational structures required to mobilize the requisite
inputs and compliances, and if it gives suitable guidance to
the search for solution to the various subproblems of economic development, reinstitutionalization, and the like. 87
The basic assumption here is that modernization will be easier if
the power structure is controlled by a radical centralized modernizing
87. Morse, Modernization by Design, supra note 79, p. 375.
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elite, dedicated to changing basic institutions in order to create what,
in their view and that of their supporters, will be a more just and progressive social order.
The Chinese modernization experience offers a good example of
the modernization initiated and directed by the political leadership.
As we mentioned earlier, China was forced into Westernization as the
result of Western dominance in the nineteenth century; the initiation
of all the programs was from the top layer of the society, the leadership. The great majority of the general population was not seriously
affected by the Western threat at that time. As a matter of fact, not
until the Communist revolution did the change finally reach villages
and countryside.
China did have a group of political and social leaders dedicated to
modernization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
But what made China fail in achieving a quick strike on modernization was the lack of a strong center of political leadership in planning
and coordinating the various modernization programs that were put
into practice in a hurry. Dr. Hu Shih pointed out "the difference between Japanese success and Chinese failure is mainly that Japan did
not lose its social center; their works were continuous and accumulative under that center, and every effort was tied to its central political
organization, i.e., the Emperor. In China, we did not have any center;
everything we did often disappeared after changes in political administration. Policy, organization and leadership were all changed. Everything had to start again from the very beginning. Nothing could be
designed for a long term perspective." 88
Modern Chinese history showed frequent changes in national administration because it was entirely built upon the charisma of the
leaderships that were unstable, short-lived, and troublesome in character. For example, during the seventeen years of the Pei-yang regime
(1912-1928), there were seven different presidents and two vice presidents of the republic, there were also thirty-three terms of national
cabinet in which twenty-nine different people served as premiers and/
or acting premiers. From 1928 to 1949, there were fifteen different
presidents and vice presidents of the Executive Yuan (the cabinet) in
the nationalist government. The lack of continuity shown in national
politics thus made a long term modernization programming
impossible.
The need for the stability of political leadership continues to play
a crucial role in the fourth stage after 1949. This factor, perhaps,
88. Hu, Collected Essays of Hu Shih, supra note 32, p. 533.
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more than anything else, can be accounted for the developmental gap
between Taiwan and Mainland China. Political stability and an integrated leadership in Taiwan have enabled Taiwan to effectively implement its socio-economic modernization plans since 1949; while in
Mainland China, constant power struggle has made it impossible for
any programming continuity. The political leaders' vision on China's
future, the ability of political leadership to commit itself for a longranged developmental change, the strategy and planning the political
leaders employed in developing China, and the cohesiveness of power
structure have proved to be vital in the Chinese efforts toward
modernization.
(4). Confucianism and Modernization. The different developmental success between Taiwan and Mainland China in the post-1949
modernization efforts also reflects the role the traditional Confucian
ethic played. In Taiwan, Confucian tradition is effectively mixed with
modernity; while in Mainland China, the destruction of Confucianism
has greatly undermined its efforts toward modernization. Evidence
from such Confucian oriented states as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan,
and Singapore have pointed to the fact that Confucianism is after all
not an obstruction to economic growth and modernization. 89
Max Weber may be correct in blaming Confucianism for the lack
of creativity and aggressiveness in pushing traditional China into developing a technological breakthrough and a capital economy. What
Weber fails to see, however, is the great potentiality of dynamic flexibility in traditional Confucian ethic that had enabled China to make
necessary adjustment. The focus of Confucianism lies in its stress on
the achievement of perfection in human role relationships, rather than
the search for individual salvation or self-realization. Since an individual's position in the society is determined by his role relations with
others, whenever those role relations change, individuals must change
accordingly. Viewing from this perspective, society as a unit of the
whole universe must also change if other units have been changed.
China may not be a great creator in technological innovation due to its
stress on conformity and integration, but China is without any dooubt
a great adapter in making necessary changes for societal survival and
89. For a discussion on the impacts on industrialization in East Asia from Confucianism, please refer to Roderick MacFarquhar, "The Post-Confucian Challenge," The Economist, (February 9, 1980), pp. 85-92. Arthur Jones, "Where Adam Smith Meets
Confucius," Forbes, (December 9, 1983), p. 113. Wen-hui Tsai, "A Comparison on the
Development between Taiwan and the Other Three Chinese Societies," China Times
Weekly, No. 48 (1986), pp. 18-19.
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growth. Modernization might have been started in the West in the
seventieth century, but Chinese civilization is quick to make necessary
accommodable change as a latecomer.
But dynamic flexibility is not the only Confucian characteristics
that is compatible with economic growth and modernization. There
are other salient features in Confucianism that are conducive to the
recent development of the nations under the Confucian influence in
Asia. Table 11 gives a concise comparison on the compatibility between Confucian ethic and the modem system of development.
As presented in the above Confucianism is not really totally incompatible to modernization. Factors that are necessary for the development of modernization are found to be very integral parts of
Confucian ethics. Confucianism is a secular system of norms and values that has provided socio-political stability and integration for over
two thousand years, the suppression of those Confucian ethics which
are favorable to modernization at the tum of the century was responsible for China's inability to deal with foreign challenge. The Communists' suppression of traditional Confucianism in the People's Republic
of China in the post-1949 era has also undermined Mainland China's
efforts toward modernization. The historical process of Chinese modernization during the past one hundred and forty years can, therefore,
be seen as a process of the struggle between the suppression and the
reappreciation of Confucianism in modem context. The realization of
Confucianism has not only made Taiwan a modernized society, but
also moved Japan, South Korea, and Singapore to economic
prosperity.
VII.

TOWARD A SYNTHETICAL THEORY

1. Two General Modernization Theories
So far, we have examined in great detail the process of China's
modernization and the existing interpretations of that process. Now,
we shall shift our attention to the construction of a higher level abstraction of a synthetical theory that could provide a better explanation of Chinese modernization and that could be empirically tested
with a certain degree of historical truth.
In developing such a theory, we must keep in mind that the Chinese experience of modernization is not occurred and operated in a
vacuum, i.e., in an isolated environment with no external contacts.
Rather, the whole process has been part of a world experience. China
started its modernization as a response to external pressure and it has
continually been affected by external factors throughout its course of

Table 11.

Confucianism and Modernization*

Ideological Features
in Confucianism

Conduciveness to
Modernization

I.

Stress harmony, see conflict as constructive
and complementary to cooperation and unity.

Unit cooperation among production, marketing.
and consumption is needed in modem economy.

2.

Secularism.

Rationalization.

3.

Emphasis on political stability

For continuity in economic programming.

4.

Encourage political leadership in guiding
mass behavior.

Political legitimacy for socio-economic change
from the top.

5.

Believe in merit

Incentive for hard work. Bureaucratization.

6.

Value universalistic education

Education is a pre-requisite for economic
development.

7.

Encourage free mobility

Free shifting labor power.

8.

Flexibility in role playing

Adaptability and crisis management.

*The compatibility between Confucianism and modernization listed here is not meant to apply to the early modernized societies such as European and
North American societies, it is aimed at the group of "late-comers" which did not start its modernization efforts until the end of the War World II,
especially the Asian societies.
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development. Theories of modernization and national development in
other parts of the world thus could be used for the construction of a
theory for China.
In general, modernization and national development theories can
be categorized into two competing schools of thought: convergence
theory vs dependency theory. Convergence theory in essence suggested that internal factors such as value, culture, and social structure
of a given society will determine the course of modernization and that
all societies will tend to move toward a western type of new social
structure.
The chief feature of the dependency theory is its insistence that it
is not internal characteristics of particular countries so much as the
structure of the international system-particularly in its economic aspects-that is the key variables to be studied in order to understand
the form that development has taken in non-western industrializing
countries. The theory argues the sovereign states of the developing
countries have long been dependent for an evolving mixture of technology, financing, markets, and basic impacts on the international economic system dominated by the capitalist power. These less developed
countries may be called "hooked" for they cannot exist without their
dependence. 90 Wallerstein declares that "in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there has been only one world system in existence, the
capital world economy." 91
The great merit of the dependency theory is that it makes us
aware how intense and complex the interactions between the developed and underdeveloped countries were. But as Smith has put it so
adequately the theory "is biased and ideological, distorting evidence."92 Smith feels the theory deprive local histories of their integrity and specificity, making local actors little more than the pawns of
outside forces. He says, "The error of this approach is . . . that it
refuses to grant the part any autonomy, any specificity, any particularity independent of its memberships on the whole. Such writing is
tyrannical. " 93
In comparison between the convergence theory and dependency
theory, one can find the strength of the convergence theory lies in its
90. Tony Smith, "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of
Dependency Theory," World Politics, (Spring 1979), pp. 247-288.
91. Immanual Wallerstein, The Modern World System (N.Y.; Academic Press, 1974),
p. 390.
92. Smith, "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory, supra note 90, p. 257.
93. Ibid., p. 258.
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emphasis on those internal variables such as institutional arrangements, cultural values, and demographic characteristics that have contributed in the modernization of a society. In contrast, the
dependency theory places a great weight on the external variables and
the interconnections between the developed and underdeveloped
countries.
2.

A Synthetical View94

There are a few empirical questions that have to be examined if
one is to understand fully the problems and process of Chinese modernization. Those questions can be grouped under these three headings: (1) The problems of impetus, (2) the responses to the impetus,
and (3) the structural change in society.
(1) The problems of impetus: In any study of the process of
modernization, the first empirical question that must be asked is "Why
change occurred?" In the case of China, the questions related to the
causes of change in China may include:
a. If the traditional social structure had remained almost
unchanged for several thousand years why did rapid
change occur during the past 140 years?
b. Is there any reason or factor behind such a change?
What kind of impetus to change emerged during this
period?
c. Is the traditional Chinese social structure functionally
incompatible with the modem development, as some
theories seemed to suggest?
d. Is there any significant change in China in the value system or individual attitude toward social stability and integration in this period.
e. Is the impetus to change the result of internal or external
pressure?
f. What was the role of the West during this period of
change?
(2) The responses to the impetus: once there is an impetus to
change, the question of how to respond becomes very important.
Some societies simply ignore the potential for change, others respond
94. For a review on the author's earlier view on Chinese modernization, please refer to
David King-Keung Chan, "Toward A Synthetic Theory of Chinese Modernization: A
Revisit of a Chinese Sociologist's Theoretical Hinterland," Proceedings of the Sixth
International Symposium on Asian Studies (Hong Kong: Asian Research Service, 1984),
pp. 45-55.
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slowly and conservatively, while still others respond with a very vigorous program. In the case of China's modernization process, the following three empirical questions are most important:
a. What was China's initial response to change for
modernization?
b. What was the attitude of the elite in the society toward
the threat for change?
c. When change became inevitable, how did China deal
with the emerging problems?
(3) The structural change in society: Here, we must look into
the problem of structural conductiveness and inconduciveness toward
change. More specifically, we must look into every major social institution--economic, political, religious, educational, and communication, etc.-to see what part they played either for or against change,
their positions in the whole social system, and their interactions with
other social structures. Finally, we must also look into the conflicts
between the traditional and the new social systems and determine
what impact they had on the advance of the process of modernization.
From these perspectives, the following empirical questions must therefore be asked in the study of China's modernization:
a. How many key traditional social systems have been
abolished in favor of modem western models?
b. How did these new western models work in transitional
China?
c. What are the consequences of such changes on the integration and stability of the society?
The above questions on Chinese modernization cannot be answered by either convergence theory or dependency theory alone. A
synthesis is thus needed. As mentioned earlier, convergence theory is
strong in examining internal changes in the course of Chinese modernization development. Taking from such a theoretical perspective, we
will find:
(1) In the traditional Chinese value system, there was a lack of
impetus for progressive change. The emphasis on harmony and integration in the main streams of the traditional Chinese ideology has
created a highly stable and tradition-oriented society in China before
the tum of the present century.
(2) The traditional social and political structures built upon
such a tradition-oriented value system was able to keep the society
stable for several thousand years without serious challenge or disorganization because traditional Chiria was, to a certain degree, geo-
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graphically isolated from other great civilizations and culturally
superior than its own neighboring societies.
(3) Modernization in China is basically a process of Westernization ever since it started in the mid-nineteenth century. Many of the
major social institutions have gradually been changed in favor of a
Western mode of social structure. In education, political, economical,
and ideological spheres, we have noticed the shift from tradition to
Western modernity.
(4) The lack of agressiveness and the stress on harmony on Confucian ethics have greatly undermined the Chinese ability to take initiative for technological and socio-political breakthrough in the early
stage of modernization. Yet, the secular and normative nature of the
Confucianism have nevertheless made it flexible in making necessary
accommodation to adopt and accept Western superior culture and to
resurface its compatible features that are conducive to economic
growth and modernization in the post-1949 era.
Dependency theory, as has been discussed, seems to be best in
explaining the external factors that have undercut the Chinese modernization effort. Taking from such a theoretical perspective, we have
to pay attention to the facts that:
(1) Contacts with the West in the nineteenth century seemed to
explore the shortcomings of the Chinese social system and, thus, resulted in a stage of disorganization and possible collapse because the
West obviously had a superior technology than China at the time. Increasing contact between the West and China made the revision and
reform of the tradition-oriented Chinese social system inevitable and
even necessary.
(2) China's location in the world political economy dominated
by the Western capialist nations must be considered of prime importance in China's failure to develop industrial capitalism during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. China was quite strongly incorporated as economic and political satellites of the Western capitalist
powers and thus lacked the autonomy to develop needed industry
while at the same time thwarted its ability to industrialize.
(3) The lack of a strong centralized political organization in
modern China in coping with problems of change has created an uncertain and ambiguous situation in which a smooth transformation
from tradition to modernity became impossible. There was no welldefined goal by which the members of the society could sincerely follow. Everybody fought only for his own particular interest, nothing
else. As a result, no continuity could be possibly achieved in China's
modernization programming during the period.
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A synthetical view of the Chinese modernization therefore must
take into account the following variables:
(I) Internal Factors:
1. Demographic factors (e.g., population size and
composition).
2. Geographical location (e.g., its relations with the
·
neighboring states).
3. Domestic politics (e.g., the elite integration, the attitudes toward modernization of the elite).
4. Value system (e.g., Confucianism, stability and integration-oriented ideology, religious beliefs).
(II) External Factors:
5. International political-economic order (e.g.,
China's position in the international world order).
6. Resources allocation and distribution (e.g., China
vs. the developed countries)
7. Foreign capital investment (e.g., foreign loans).
An analysis of any of the above variables will not only provide us
an analytical frame of reference in understanding the past process of
China's modernization, it will also help us in making a prediction of
the future course and final goal of China's modernization effort. The
road toward modernization has been long and painful in the experience of Chinese people, it is about time we give this experience a thorough and systematic investigation.
Based upon the above discussion, the following propositions have
been developed with the hope that they would be tested empirically in
the future:
PROPOSITION 1:

The large population size China has and the
isolated geographical location China is located
have created an equilibrium-oriented society in
traditional China in which stability, integration, and maintaining status quo are the
predominate value, which in tum then condemn any radical progressive socio-cultural
change.
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PROPOSITION II:

PROPOSITION III:

PROPOSITION IV:

PROPOSITION V:

VIII.
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Confucianism is both conservative and progressive. As a conservative ideology in an
equilibrium-oriented China, Confucianism
functioned as a system-maintenance mechanism in upholding status quo; As a progressive
ideology, however, it provided a much needed
legitimation to political and economic leadership in their pursuit of radical and progressive
change in China.
Elite integration is a necessary condition in the
success of China's modernization effort. The
more integrated the political elite at the policy
making group is, the more likely the success of
modernization programming and its implementation.
The effective adoption of western mode of production, technology, and system of management is a necessary condition to China's
economic industrialization. The more the
political and economic elite are aware of
China's position in the international world
order, the more likely the success of China's
economic industrialization and its subsequent
socio-political modernization.
The more China is modernizing itself, the
more it will share with other modernized
socieites similar economic, political, and sociocultural features. Along the way, a process of
sinification of these features will also be taken
place.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

After nearly one and half century since China started its efforts
toward modernization in the mid-19th century, success finally seems
within reach for all Chinese. Taiwan has enjoyed a remarkable socioeconomic "miracle" during the past thirty years, while the recent
"pragmatic" approach advocated by Mainland China under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping has brought a new hope and an improved
way of life. Although Taiwan and Mainland China are still fall apart
in every aspect, a new process of convergence is now taking place that
both sides of the Taiwan Strait will converge socio-economically. It is
evident that the more Mainland China pushes its Four Moderniza-
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tions Program, the more it will follow the footsteps of Taiwan. Political differences may still exist, but modernization will eventually draw
these two Chinese societies closer.
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